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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Romanians Reportedly Knew of Plans To Kill Pope

AU0805164491 Sofia BTA in English 1546 GMT
8 May 91

[Text] Ankara, May 8 (BTA)—In its latest issue the Turkish Magazine "TEMPO" dwells on the still unclarified aspects of the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II.

The leading item on this subject is headlined "Romanians Knew About the Plot to Kill the Pope." It points out that ten years after the attempt on the life of the pope, the truth about this crime has not been revealed. The magazine stresses that the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the U.S. CIA and the Soviet KGB have not been affected by glasnost, but nevertheless the day is coming when the truth will finally surface.

"The first positive step in this direction was made by Bulgarian President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. During his visit to the U.S. in September last year President Zhelev said that he would insist that independent sources investigate whether the Bulgarian secret services are involved in the papal assassination attempt. The president said Bulgaria would ask assistance from foreign intelligence services and that it had already got into contact with the CIA," "TEMPO" writes. The magazine stresses that the Bulgarian president has also taken practical steps towards carrying out the investigation and that Bulgaria will host a meeting of an international commission chaired by U.S. Professor Alan Weinstein. "It is a pity that President Zhelev's appeal to all interested sides to open their records on the matter has met no response yet. [no closing quotes received]

"TEMPO" writes that Mr. Vladimir Bereanu, a journalist and a contributor to the magazine in Bulgaria, has contacted former Romanian secret services officials on behalf of the magazine. One of the officials agreed to answer the questions of "TEMPO" on condition that his name is not mentioned. The magazine publishes the shorthand record of Mr. Bereanu's conversation with this high-placed Romanian official who, according to Mr. Bereanu, was No. 2 in the Romanian secret services. The Romanian official said that thanks to their close links with the Grey Wolves in the then West Germany the Romanian secret services knew that an attempt on the pope's life was being prepared. He added that six months before the assassination attempt the Romanian secret services were informed about the two assassination plans proposed by Agca.

On Ceausescu's instructions this information was kept secret even from the Warsaw Pact allies, but a part of it was submitted to the French secret services in exchange for information needed by the Romanian intelligence.

Asked about Bulgaria's role in the assassination attempt, the former No. 2 said that he believed the Bulgarians

learnt about the affair from the "PRAVDA" daily. "This was a great trick. Although the very execution of the plot was rather amateurish, the CIA and the Italian secret services SISMI jumped at the opportunity for spreading false information and taking the investigators off the scent."

Under the headline "Bulgaria Is Not Involved," "TEMPO" runs Mr. Bereanu's interview with Gen. Yordan Ormankov who was in charge of Bulgaria's investigation into the assassination attempt. Gen. Ormankov said he was absolutely sure that Bulgaria's involvement in the attempt on the pope's life is out of question.

BULGARIA

Prosecutor's Role Under Future Constitution

91BA0532A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
4 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Yavor Boyadzhiev, Sofia City prosecutor: "The Prosecutor's Office and the Future Constitution"]

[Text] Our country is in a state of transition from a totalitarian to a democratic state-legal system, which must be expressed with the new legislation. This transition, although peaceful, is a real revolution, a categorical rejection of the past and the establishment of an entirely new and, this time, democratic social system. That is why it is improper to borrow, ready-made, some of the existing democratic constitutions or parts of them. Such parts must be studied but not duplicated. We must extract the common democratic principles they embody and draft our constitution on the basis of such principles, taking into consideration the national and historical features and the level of legal awareness of our people.

To begin with, this applies to the principle of the separation of powers. Bearing in mind that we are entering the path of democracy quite late, the basic democratic principles must be applied in full and to the end, consistently, and with no deviations whatsoever. One such deviation, for example, is placing the justice system under the Council of Ministers, and the Prosecutor's Office and preliminary investigations under the courts.

It is a universally acknowledged basic democratic principle of the separation of powers not to mix but clearly to separate from each other the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, both functionally and organizationally. The judicial branch must be kept separate as a distinct and autonomous organ, equal to the parliament, which is the legislative branch, and to the Council of Ministers, which is the executive branch.

The judiciary should be organized as a separate supreme authority—the judicial magistracy or the judicial council. Its internal organization must be based on the specific functions of the judicial authorities, consistent

with the nature of the judicial process—penal, civil, and administrative—as well as the justice administering authorities. Therefore, it may be suggested for the judicial magistracy to be headed by a chairman and deputy chairmen, each of whom would be in charge of a respective department (a magistrate). The departments would include preliminary investigations, prosecution, the bar, the notary system, the courts, and judicial execution. The court would encompass the penal, civil, and administrative process, which, in the judicial execution, would correspond to the penal, civil, and administrative execution.

In the penal process, it is necessary to clearly single out the authorities who will be carrying out this function, and to unite them in an integral system in which everyone would be performing his own functions. Only under such circumstances could we ensure the normal development of the penal process. The preliminary investigation should be taken away from the executive authorities and included in the magistracy as an independent department, equal to the judicial department. The Prosecutor's Office, as well, should become a separate department of the magistracy, equal to the judicial department. This is made necessary by the specific functions of the prosecutor in the penal process, which are different from the functions of the courts.

A number of considerations may be brought forth in support of the suggestion of organizing the prosecutor's office as an independent department within the framework of the magistracy. They include the following:

A material penal-legal relationship is established between the state and the subject of the crime whenever a crime of a general nature has been committed, by virtue of which the state acquires the subjective right to impose, and the subject the obligation to accept, the punishment stipulated by the law. In the penal process, each procedural subject has his special place and performs his specific functions: The prosecutor exercises this legal obligation on the part of the state and brings to light the nature of the legal relation from the positions of the subjective right of the state, and the defense attorney considers this from the positions of the subject of the crime. The prosecutor and the defense are the two adversarial sides in the penal process, enjoying equal procedural facilities. The court stands outside and above the material penal-legal relation and, on the basis of this position, determines its nature and makes the final decision, taking into consideration the viewpoints of the two adversarial sides. That is why making the prosecutor organizationally a part of the court is as abnormal as it would be to assign the defense attorney to the court. Including the prosecutor alone as part of the court would disrupt the balance between the adversarial parties and would seriously harm the competitive principle in the penal process because, at that point, one of the sides would be on the inside while the other would be on the outside, which would discredit the objective nature of the trial.

The court participates only in the judicial stage of the penal process: from the presentation of the charges to the sentencing (the resolution). It is inadmissible for the court to participate in the preliminary investigation or in the execution of the sentence, either functionally or organizationally. The inclusion of the Prosecutor's Office within the court sector would mean that this sector would interfere in the pretrial and the posttrial stages of the case because the prosecutor participates in all stages of the penal process: from the start of the establishment of a penal legal relationship to its completion after the sentence has been carried out.

The penal process, as a sequence of strictly arranged and consecutive procedural actions, along with the procedural subjects participating in it, is an integral system consisting of specifically defined subsystems and parts, each one different from the others. It is precisely the distinction and clear demarcation of the individual parts and their interaction that makes them part of such a system. This calls for demarcations according to function and organization of the individual parts of the penal process; it requires the functional and organizational separation of the prosecution from the court.

The organization of the magistracy as a system of different departments provides much richer legal opportunities for cooperation and for improvements both of its own structure and activities as well as of the governmental and legal structure.

Like the Council of Ministers and the individual ministries, the magistracy will have the right to issue legal acts pertaining to the judiciary as a whole and to its individual departments, according to their jurisdiction.

Legislative initiative may be exerted not only by the magistracy as a whole and not only by the chairman of the judicial department but also by the attorney general and the chairmen of the other departments.

Both the judicial department and the Prosecutor's Office will be able to take the initiative, on the basis of their own positions, on declaring the unconstitutionality of certain legal and administrative acts, the repeal of sentences and judicial decisions, the interpretation of Supreme Court decisions, and the proper interpretation of National Assembly laws, and so forth.

The suggestion that the prosecution be made part of the court is motivated by two concepts:

First, a reference to the organization of the judicial system under the Turnovo Constitution and more recent constitutions adopted by other democratic countries. However, in this case, the fact is ignored that such a judicial system is not entirely consistent with the principle of the separation of powers and that this is an imperfection that was allowed to take place in the past. Another imperfection is that of including organizationally the judicial authority as part of the supreme authority of the executive branch through the Ministry

of Justice. Now, when a new constitution is being drafted, this imperfection should be avoided.

The other consideration is a reaction to the fact that the Prosecutor's Office has been granted so far extraneous functions that go beyond its purpose as an institution supervising the precise and equal observance of the laws. Such functions could be eliminated if the Prosecutor's Office is separated from the courts.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the Prosecutor's Office should be organized as a separate department of the judicial powers, within a common judicial council (the magistracy).

BNDP Proposes Law on Culture, Religion

91BA0470A Sofia ZORA in Bulgarian 5 Mar 91 p 5

[Draft law submitted by the Bulgarian National Democratic Party, BNDP, based on and as a supplement to Article 35, paragraphs 2 and 4, Article 45, paragraph 7, Article 52, and Article 53, paragraphs 1-4 of the Constitution of the Bulgarian Republic: "BNDP Legislative Initiative"]

[Text] We submit to the attention of the public a draft law on the free manifestation of the cultural and religious identity of the Bulgarian citizen, adopted by the BNDP [Bulgarian National Democratic Party] Administrative Council and officially submitted to the presidency and the Grand National Assembly. The reasons for which this is being done only now are the as follows:

First: Unlike the noisy self-promoting of many others, we have always aspired, without unnecessary noise, to be in the service of our fatherland. This also was the main reason for the formulation of our own draft as an alternative to the draft law on the Presidency.

Second: At the present time (how many times already!), we are witnessing the latest display of a lack of principle and adaptation to the circumstances in the behavior of governmental authorities and most political parties. We are publishing our draft law as the latest proof of the consistency in the ideas that we proclaimed in our program and that we have always followed in dealing with the various aspects of the Bulgarian national interests, combined with our democratic traditions and international standards, and, in defending, above all, the interests of the individual.

Third: We are publishing our draft also to distance ourselves from the self-serving statements on the subject of the crisis, once again imposed upon Bulgarian society, in connection with the study of the Turkish language in Bulgarian schools. We are doing this with the conviction that, in this manner, we shall be able to present our attitude concerning the entire range of problems and not only about a single one of its aspects, such as the question of language. It is true that we note with pleasure the number of parties and party leaders who are "borrowing" some of our ideas, although their ideology may

be diametrically opposed to ours. We fear, however, that our individual approach has only been mechanically duplicated and has not been the result of an integral and ideologically interpreted position and that circumstantial changes will continue for a long time to shape the political appearance of our parties. It is as though the deliberately applied tactics of problems concerning this painful matter to our public continue to be resolved piecemeal, for the sake of periodically triggering crises within our society. Why is it precisely now, in the middle of the school year and not, for instance, at its beginning, that the question of the study of the maternal language in school is raised? Could it be because at that time Andrey Lukanov was prime minister and that now Bulgarian society is stunned by the shock of the economic reform? The conclusion simply imposes itself that certain forces are deliberately encouraging conflicts so that later they may appear in the role of pacifiers.

We are convinced that, by following our ideologically motivated and noncircumstantial approach, we shall be able to ensure internal stability and the unification of our nation and build a democracy with the Bulgarian colors.

Law on the Free Manifestation of the Cultural and Religious Identity of the Bulgarian Citizen

Article 1. Anyone born in the territory of the Bulgarian Republic is a Bulgarian.

(1) Any Bulgarian citizen is free to profess his ethnic self-awareness and support ethnocultural, religious, and linguistic traditions and distinctive features within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of the country.

(2) In the exercise of these rights, no Bulgarian citizen has the right to block the aspiration of another individual to exercise them to the same extent, as well as society as a whole, to implement its overall political, economic, and cultural interests and needs.

Article 2. The founding, registration, and functioning of sociopolitical and party formations based on ethnic and religious grounds is prohibited.

Article 3. Bulgarian citizens are equal in the eyes of the law, and ethnic self-awareness cannot be a basis for restricting individual, human, civil, and political freedoms. Specific collective privileges or restrictions based on ethnic self-awareness, which is the natural right of the individual, are not allowed.

Article 4. (1) Any action aimed at the coerced denationalization of Bulgarian citizens is forbidden.

(2) The propaganda of ideas or actions aimed at dividing Bulgarian citizens or pitting them against each other on the basis of ethnic, territorial, or religious characteristics is forbidden.

(3) Any action aimed at promoting hatred or hostility among citizens, based on ethnic or religious affiliation, is

forbidden. Violations of this article shall be punished in accordance with the Penal Code.

Article 5. Bulgarian is the official language in the Bulgarian Republic.

(1) The Bulgarian language is mandatorily used in all types and levels of governmental institutions.

(2) Judicial proceedings are mandatorily conducted in the Bulgarian language.

(3) The Bulgarian language shall be the only one allowed to be used in all forms of sociopolitical manifestations.

(4) All types of documents, the content of which is subject to control by state authorities, shall be drafted and disseminated in the Bulgarian language.

(5) All types of official relations and reciprocal relations between Bulgarian physical and juridical persons, as well as between them and the permanent agents of mixed or foreign juridical persons on the country's territory, shall take place in the Bulgarian language.

(6) All Bulgarian citizens exercising professional or official obligations within the country's territory must use the official language, unless the nature of their activities requires the use of another language.

Article 6. (1) All Bulgarian citizens have the right to use their native tongue regardless of whether or not it is Bulgarian.

(2) A Bulgarian citizen of non-Bulgarian origin has the right to study, optionally, and for pay, his native language outside the regular school curriculum, while preserving the official nature of the Bulgarian language in the educational system.

(3) The creation of educational institutions on all levels and the training they offer on the territory of the country must be based on programs and textbooks and taught by accredited teachers, approved by the authorized state authorities.

Article 7. (1) Any citizen of the Bulgarian Republic has the right of access to open public information.

(2) Any public information that is disseminated must be accessible to and understood by all Bulgarian citizens.

Article 8. Cultural and religious monuments are protected by the law regardless of their ethnocultural nature and origin.

Article 9. The Orthodox Christian religion of the Eastern denomination, as the religion of the predominant part of the Bulgarian nation and a basic factor in the historical formation of its identity, is the basis for determining the official holiday system of the country.

Article 10. The exercise of the rights based on this law should not conflict with the Constitution and the laws of

the country, and must not violate the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security of the state.

Diplomatic, Foreign Ministry Staff Cuts

AU0405185191 Sofia ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME
in Bulgarian 25 Apr 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "53 Bulgarian Diplomats Will Shortly Be Returning Home"]

[Text] Yesterday [24 April], at its weekly meeting with Bulgarian and foreign journalists, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that on 1 January 1991 the foreign diplomatic representations of the Republic of Bulgaria had 724 permanent posts—347 diplomatic and 377 technical.

In compliance with this year's decree of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister Viktor Vulkov has issued an order, with effect from 1 July of this year, that 145 posts will be cut in the foreign diplomatic representations—53 diplomatic and 92 technical. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also proposed to the Council of Ministers that six diplomatic representations be closed. In addition, the staff at the Foreign Ministry's head office, which numbered 922 on 1 January of this year, should be cut by 20 percent. The Council of Ministers' decree sets the number of permanent posts at the ministry's head office at 772. It was mentioned that, in addition to the present cuts, the ministry's staffing had been reduced by 26 percent in 1990.

It was announced that Dimitur Romanov, former ambassador to Lusaka, had been released from his post, and that proceedings against him were being brought by the Chief Prosecutor's Office in connection with misappropriating approximately \$33,000. Ambassadors Toncho Chakurov (Prague), Aleksandur Karlov Atanasov (Zimbabwe), Petur Mezhdurechki (Berlin), Georgi Karamanov (Athens), and others have also been recalled. Dismissed were Lubomir Shopov, the head of the "Balkan Countries" Department; Trifon Pashov, the consul general in Leningrad; and others. A special certifying commission has begun its work at the ministry to assess the professional qualities of prospective job candidates against 22 criteria.

Several newly appointed ambassadors of Bulgaria were announced: in Belgium—Mrs. Lea Koen; in the Republic of Afghanistan—Mr. Valentin Gatsinski; and in the Republic of Greece—Mr. Bogdan Bogdanov.

BCP Money Reportedly Laundered in Germany

AU0805133991 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
7 May 91 p 12

[Report by Boris Kalnoky: "Money of Bulgarian Communist Party Laundered in Germany?"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—Money belonging to the former Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] has apparently been

deposited in banks in Germany and other Western countries for "laundering purposes." According to the Bulgarian opposition politician Ventsislav Dimitrov, intermediaries of the Bulgarian secret service abroad organize the laundering of the money.

Dimitrov, who heads the parliamentary committee for banks and finances, told DIE WELT that, in view of its uncertain prospects in the next parliamentary elections, the Bulgarian Socialist Party is trying to transfer its money abroad. Even the ambassador to Bonn was involved in the affair and recalled.

The new Bulgarian ambassador to Bonn, Stoyan Stalev, who was accredited on 8 April, declined to comment on accusations leveled against his predecessor but confirmed indirectly to DIE WELT that the "money laundering" problem exists. It is extremely difficult to uncover such activities, Stalev stressed. [passage omitted]

Electoral Commission Appoints Replacement MP

*AU0805183991 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1630 GMT 8 May 91*

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission held a meeting in Hall No. 1 at the National Assembly today. It declared that Milancho Petrov Kolev, the sixth name on the party list of the Bulgarian Socialist Party for the 27th Shumen Multimandate Constituency, was appointed to take the place of People's Deputy Ivan Abadzhiev, who had submitted his resignation.

More on BSP Ideological Platforms Debates

*AU0805155991 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 4 May 91
pp 1-2*

[Report by Dora Chichkova: "Ideological Currents Within the Bulgarian Socialist Party Discuss Trends of Change"]

[Text] "The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]—Trends of Change" was the topic of a discussion held in Veliko Turnovo yesterday, which gathered representatives from the Alternative Socialist Association [ASO], the Road to Europe platform, the Movement for Radical Change, the Marxist platform, both wings of the Marxist Alternative, members of the BSP Supreme Council Presidium, and National Assembly deputies. The discussion was held in connection with the festivities on the occasion of the centennial of the first Socialist gathering in Bulgaria.

The party as an ideological-political community of people does not exist in our country as yet, ASO Chairman Valentin Vatshev stated at the meeting. In his opinion, the party and the state are already separated in "everyday life," but, in the people's minds, they still represent an indivisible entity.

It is utopian to demand that the BSP become a modern party overnight, Miroslav Popov, cochairman of the Road to Europe Movement, pointed out. Objective

processes of de-Bolshevization are under way within the BSP. They are irreversible, but their pace of development is determined by the general trend of political processes in our country.

As a historian, I can say that history takes its revenge for every change that is too hastily and too inappropriately implemented, Iskra Baeva added. I am definitely in favor of gradual changes, she pointed out.

It is dangerous to divide socialism and social democracy today, Dimitur Yonchev, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, further stated. We share the same fate, but the current political circumstances oppose us to each other.

Aleksandur Marinov, member of the BSP Supreme Council Presidium, pointed out that social democratization is the chief criterion for the change within the BSP. Social democracy in Europe has already realized its shortcomings and is searching for new trends of development, he argued. Elena Poptodorova replied that, unfortunately, this is not the case in our country because we have not yet reached this stage of development, though we are experienced in skipping the stages of development, which is certainly nothing to be proud of. Even among members of the BSP Supreme Council, there are people who frankly admit that they do not share the ideas of the platform adopted at our last congress. How can we talk about unity under such circumstances? Are we talking about the unity of people who are about to perish, or about unity based on an unmistakable political orientation?

SDS Chairman on Zhivkov Trial

*91BA0466A Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 15 Mar 91 p 4*

[Interview with jurist Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Coordination Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, on the terminological specifics of the Penal Code, by Mayya Lyubomirska; place and date not given: "Can Zhivkov Be Tried for the Renaissance Process?"]

[Text] Recurrences of the so-called renaissance process, which was raised to the level of state policy between 1984 and 1989, periodically break out in areas with mixed populations. Currently, this involves arguments and hunger strikes "for" and "against" the study of the Turkish language in Bulgarian schools. Meanwhile, Case No. 1 does not deal with the culpability of the former first secretary concerning the national problem. The explanation is that the existing Penal Code calls for liability for encouraging national hostility among minorities. It was claimed that Bulgaria had no minorities; instead, it had ethnic groups. For that reason, my first question addressed to Filip Dimitrov, not as chairman of the SDS Coordination Council but as a lawyer, was:

[Lyubomirska] Could the former head of state, Todor Zhivkov, be held liable for the renaissance process?

[Dimitrov] Almost everyone in this country knows that the renaissance process is a crime that violates humanity and is related to violence and excesses committed against the people. The consequences of it set one part of the Bulgarian people against another and created a political clash of a type that had not existed in Bulgaria for more than a century. I am simply unwilling to discuss some of the charges leveled at Mr. Zhivkov because, in a certain sense, they are petty and pitiful. Viewed from a certain angle, the communist dictatorship, in addition to major crimes, committed petty, base actions that we are finding out about in the course of the trial. It is a very good thing that we can see these facts in order to realize that there is nothing great in the great crimes committed by communism.

Consistent with the traditions and the frame of mind of the renaissance process, we become shy when we discuss the crimes related to ethnic communities. Matters have gone so far, you see, that it is being claimed by some that the actions of the ruling upper crust during the renaissance process were not criminal because our Penal Code speaks of national hostility and national hatred, whereas Bulgaria had no national minorities but only ethnic groups, for which reason the actions did not fall under the stipulations of Article 162 of the Penal Code. Mystification is being created on this subject, and the people do not dare discuss it for fear of being accused of lacking patriotism. This is not a serious attitude, at least from the point of view of the Penal Code.

The Bulgarian Penal Code was drafted in 1968, under the so-called Dimitrov Constitution. It deals with problems pertaining to what has now become fashionable to call ethnic groups: Article 79 specifically mentions national minorities. In the terminology of the then Constitution, what we today call ethnic groups were then called national minorities. I believe that no one would think that the nature of the Turkish population in Bulgaria changed with the change in the Constitution. Clearly, this referred to one and the same thing. Consequently, any talk of national hostility applies not only to relations outside the framework of the Bulgarian state but precisely to the nature of the activities we are discussing. They are aimed at groups of people that were then described as national minorities. Consequently, to claim that such actions do not constitute crimes is, to put it mildly, unacceptable.

Let me emphasize that, in international legal norms, no distinction is made between the concepts of national and ethnic. This matter is considered with a view to certain rights, and violations of such rights. Some use the terms national and ethnic, or else national or ethnic, interchangeably, without ascribing specific features to such texts. When we speak of a national minority, we have in mind the guaranteeing of certain collective rights and the providing of collective guarantees—that is, not some specific rights that this group as a group could exercise, but a guarantee given to the members of this group, enabling them to exercise their human rights. This proceeds from the point of view of their vulnerability.

From that point on, the rights that are guaranteed to them are within the framework of common human rights.

In Bulgaria, the rights of religious belief, the use of the native language, and the practice of certain ordinary and cultural activities are acknowledged. Therefore, concern about the use of such concepts is largely false. It is one of those fictitious things used to frighten the people. Accepting the obvious interpretation of the law, to the effect that this applies to a criminal action—the promotion of national hostility—is something that could hardly threaten the security of our state. What threatens it, rather, is the fact that a mythology is being created on matters of said human groups and that such problems are becoming taboo. This leads to suspicion, mistrust, and fear.

The prosecutorial authorities should put an end to such unnecessary shyness, and, if they indeed have decided to apply the law, they should clearly raise the question of the actions related to the renaissance process. Shedding light on this process would finally free the people in these areas and also free them from that gang that organized this set of crimes.

[Lyubomirska] What are the penalties stipulated by the law?

[Dimitrov] What the law stipulates is not all that strict: inciting national hostility is not considered a severe crime in the legal sense. Retribution for such actions should be established. What is essential is not how many years a person spends in jail. This is the least of my worries. We must condemn once and for all the practice of a leadership that acted against the national interests, of an administration that created problems for our people, problems that will take years to resolve. These problems are being used today to hinder democratic processes.

[Lyubomirska] And which continue to be resolved piecemeal?

[Dimitrov] The piecemeal solution has become the favorite formula of the Fatherland Labor Party. It is being claimed that the national problem should be resolved in its entirety. Actually, the national problem is a problem of human rights. In a democratic society, we cannot resolve it with the help of a large number of correlations among ethnic communities. We must proceed from the view that the people are equal and that their equal rights must be respected and guaranteed. To oppose the guaranteeing of a certain right by demanding the resolution of the problem on a global scale smacks of apartheid. Therefore, I cannot accept this formula. That such matters should be resolved systematically is a different question.

[Lyubomirska] How do international documents solve the problem of minorities?

[Dimitrov] Article 27 of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights is indicative: "In countries within which there are ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities, individuals belonging to such minorities may not be refused the right, along with other members of their group, to make use of their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to make use of their own language." There is no strict definition of the concept of minority in international law.

Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination reads: "In this convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall apply to any demarcation, exclusion, limitation, or preference based on race, origin, or national and ethnic affiliation, the purpose of which would be to deny or obstruct the recognition, implementation, and exercise, on an equal basis, of the rights and basic freedoms of man in the political, economic, social, cultural, and all other areas of social life." It is thus that, in a negative way, the framework of the rights that must be acknowledged is defined.

[Lyubomirska] Who benefits from the current Zhivkov-Balev trial?

[Dimitrov] This problem is quite complex. In the final account, it is the people who win from each such trial. However pitiful the range of the charges, a certain set of facts that had remained concealed becomes clear. In the case of some people, perhaps the formulation of such a charge is a manifestation of the timidity or weakness of the judicial authorities when faced with formerly powerful people. Time will definitely show that freedom from fear is a gradual process. Obviously, psychological barriers that are difficult to cross exist. The idea that people who stand above the law are untouchable exists in all of us. However, we saw how it was seriously shaken up and how pieces of it crumbled. We have carried this idea in us all too long. From this point of view, to make the major step all of a sudden is a dangerous thing because we saw what happened in Romania, and we saw how the trial of Ceausescu had nothing in common with justice. In Bulgaria, matters are taking place gradually. It is clear that this, too, had a modest start. We have reason to believe that the gradually developing processes are an indication of a certain stability.

Former KGB General on Umbrella Murder

91BA0538A Sofia DEMOKRATIYA in Bulgarian
6 Apr 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by Asen Geshakov; place and date not given: "Zhivkov Was the Organizer of the Assassination; Georgi Markov Fell Victim to the International Friendship Between the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the KGB"; interview was broadcast on Bulgarian television on 5 April 1991]

[Text] [Geshakov] Oleg Danilovich, your interview on Radio Liberty made a great deal of noise in Bulgaria, and

not only in that county. However, it is one thing to be quoted in a newspaper article and something entirely different to hear you live. Tell us, please, what was the participation of the Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union in the murder of Georgi Markov, the Bulgarian dissident and emigre writer?

[Kalugin] Let us start with the first part of your question. What was broadcast on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe was, actually, an excerpt of my book, which is being prepared for publication in the West and, naturally, in the Soviet Union. As for the topic itself, this entire situation developed as follows: One day I was visiting Andropov, together with Kryuchkov, who was at that time the head of intelligence. His deputy, General Usatov, was present. The case of Markov was mentioned in the course of the discussion of various problems because Kryuchkov had reported to Andropov that he was in possession of a letter written by Minister Stoyanov, although I am not sure that it was a letter. This is an important consideration. It was a request by Stoyanov to help our Bulgarian friends deal with Markov, who had been quite close to the Zhivkov family and was familiar with many aspects of the life of his "court" and with his private family life and, subsequently, had left for the West, where he had started to work for the BBC and had repeatedly made anticommunist and anti-Zhivkov broadcasts. This request was passed on by Kryuchkov to Andropov. Hearing this, Andropov stood up from his chair—I remember the episode perfectly—and began to slowly pace the length of his office. He then said words that are of great importance: "I am against political assassinations. Whoever may be making such requests, we should not become involved in such matters." At that point, Kryuchkov said: "You understand, Yuriy Vladimirovich, this is a request made by Comrade Zhivkov, and the minister is forwarding it at the request of the president and the general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party. If we refuse this request, Zhivkov may get the impression that Comrade Stoyanov has no authority in our country and that, in general, the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward the Bulgarian leadership is not as warm as is being claimed publicly and officially. After thinking about it, Andropov said: "All right. I do not object, but there should be no personal participation! Send them specialists, send them the necessary equipment and special means, and show the Bulgarians how all this should be done, but no more! I oppose any other participation whatsoever. Enough!"

Then my two fellow workers—at that time I was chief of external counterintelligence—went to Sofia, where they met with Bulgarian comrades. I know that at that time they were seen by Vasil Kotsev, the then chief of intelligence in Bulgaria. They undertook to instruct the respective individuals to whom this action had been entrusted.

Several attempts were made. The first effort to render Markov harmless involved applying a special cream on his skin. At that time, Markov should have been resting somewhere on a beach on the Mediterranean and, in the

crowd and bustle, it would have been very easy to make a small smear on his body. It was assumed that such an ointment, which was available to the KGB, would stop the heartbeat at the latest after 24 hours, depending on the condition of the victim. This option was being worked on but was not used. I no longer recall why. The second option was to use the same preparation, but with alcohol, at a meal. To the best of my recollection, this was done somewhere not far from Munich, if I am not mistaken, but it yielded no results, either because the poison was not used properly or for some other reason. In short, there were no results. This led to the London phase, in the course of which a weapon firing at small distances was used; the umbrella was pure cover. This worked. As I remember, Markov died the next day. Later our Bulgarian comrades, making use of their experience, decided to conduct the same operation against Kostov, a former major in Bulgarian intelligence in France....

[Geshakov] Vladimir Kostov....

[Kalugin] Precisely. However, this attempt failed, because the charge must have been of inadequate quality and because Kostov was able to discover it in time and even, in my view, to raise such a stir that, in the end, nothing was accomplished. I remember that there were extensive comments on this case, and, naturally, this confused our leaders, who believed that this way of eliminating someone was secure and undetectable. I also recall that at that time a meeting was held in the office of Comrade Chebrikov, who was in charge of that aspect of the operation, not specifically and directly but as an observer of the KGB laboratory that makes poisons and other special things. It was important for him, as an observer, to know what had failed to act and why. I do not know the reason for the failure in the Kostov case, but that is what happened....

[Geshakov] Among others, Kostov himself claims that the attempt made against his life was not after the assassination of Georgi Markov but two weeks previously. Do you know anything about that?

[Kalugin] To be honest, I do not recall the chronology, but I believe it was Markov who was first. Incidentally, Kostov, for that reason, reacted all the more strongly because the Markov occurrence had already taken place and, although it was unclear, it somehow made him think something dirty was happening when, in the subway, people came close to him and did what they did.

[Geshakov] Do you recall the date of the discussion with Andropov? In what month of 1978 did it take place?

[Kalugin] I cannot recall the precise month, but the discussion took place at least six months before the operation started because the first project developed was the southern variant, that of the Mediterranean, which had to do with the beach, followed by the German and, in all, this took some four to five months. I recall that some people were displeased by how slowly such a simple problem was being resolved.

[Geshakov] Tell us, Oleg Danilovich, what personal advantage would have accrued to Kryuchkov, by no means a stupid person who, furthermore, was opposed from the very beginning to the anti-Markov operation?

[Kalugin] I believe that as a person who had long been involved in work with a socialist country—in this case, Hungary—and as chief of intelligence and in charge of strengthening friendship and cooperation with friendly intelligence services, Kryuchkov simply wanted to render a service to those who were requesting it. I believe that he did not consider even for a moment the punitive aspect of this matter. As a statesman, however, Andropov was thinking along other lines. He knew that this was an assassination, after all, a political assassination without any trial or investigation, essentially organized by a small circle of people.

[Geshakov] Judging by what you said, in reference to instructors, equipment, and so forth, does this mean that the people who actually committed this assassination were Bulgarian citizens?

[Kalugin] Unfortunately, that I do not know. I was never interested in this aspect of the matter. Our Bulgarian comrades and friends, as we called them then, had their own capabilities, and the way they used them was unknown to me. They had their own people who worked in Bulgarian intelligence, but I do not know their nationality.

[Geshakov] Are you sure that the umbrella and everything about it—the pellet made of a platinum-iridium alloy with three openings, the ricin, the jelly lining, and so forth—was developed in the KGB laboratories?

[Kalugin] Of course! Bulgaria had never been engaged in such projects and, why, being such a small country, should it engage in such experimentation? It was natural for them to turn to their fraternal country that has had such a capability since Stalin's time. This laboratory was set up in Stalinist times, and it simply developed and existed, and I assume that it exists to this day. Incidentally, as a people's deputy, I would like, in the second reading of the law on the KGB, for the question of the structure of the KGB to be raised. Let us look at it: These structure and functions are totally consistent with the structure and functions of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. The fact that the KGB is not using them to their fullest extent is a different matter. The potential, however, has been preserved. Let us destroy these structures that today are totally inconsistent with basic views on decency, human rights, lawfulness, and so on. Whatever it may be, a political assassination means lawlessness, and this is not to be tolerated. Incidentally, the reason I decided to tell all this is in no way related to betraying a state secret. This is not a secret of the state but a secret of a corporation that is capable of committing murder despite the law, without trial or investigation. I have a moral right to say this, and I am doing so.

[Geshakov] Why did you decide to make these revelations precisely now?

[Kalugin] I mentioned them for the first time, although without providing specific names and circumstances, last year, when I spoke at the conference of democratic forces in Moscow. I said then that to this day the KGB has the potential for the physical elimination of people and for harming their health. I also said that in the course of time I would make these facts public. Honestly speaking, the fact that this is taking place now is, in a certain sense, a coincidence, because, if my manuscript had not fallen into the hands of people who requested me to make such facts public as this time, they would have become known only at the end of the year, when my book is to be published. However, I had no intention of waiting for the book to be published because I know that Zhivkov is currently being tried, and that Zhivkov is prevaricating and trying to present himself as an innocent, honest, and decent person. However, he was the organizer of the assassination. That is unquestionable! He was the main culprit of that crime! The KGB helped. It assisted, and there is not doubt that it bears moral and other responsibility for it. To be honest, I, too, share some of the guilt. Among others, I received from Minister Stoyanov a Belgian Browning pistol with a personal bronze inscription, which I may display eventually, if I am requested to do so. It is true that the inscription does not indicate why I received it, but it reads as follows: "From Minister Stoyanov to Oieg Kalugin." Therefore, if we have indeed decided honestly to break with our past, we should be honest today. We should say that such things will never again happen, and that we condemn and curse what happened and put an end to it. When we say that no such thing ever occurred—such as, for instance, yesterday I was officially accused of slandering—this indicates that the KGB has not changed its practice in the least. It is lying, and it is lying not only to the people, which is routine for the KGB, but it is also lying to its own leaders. For example, I am not sure that Kryuchkov honestly reported to Gorbachev the truth of what happened. I fully believe he may have said: "Nothing of the sort ever happened." However, this is not the only "story" I know. I have many such stories, and, as time goes on, I will describe at least another one in which, with an equal lie on a high level, we denied our participation in crimes or actions that, to put it mildly, are criminally punishable.

[Geshakov] You say that, in fact, Todor Zhivkov was the main initiator of Markov's political assassination....

[Kalugin] Unquestionably!

[Geshakov] At the beginning of this week, Dimitur Stoyanov publicly refuted what you said concerning the participation of the KGB. He claimed not to have sent any kind of telegram or to have written any kind of letter, seeking assistance, and so on. How do you assess his reaction?

[Kalugin] Let us begin with the fact that our entire system was trained to never acknowledge anything unless proof is provided—irrefutable proof. I remember an American movie I saw a long time ago that I liked. The wife catches her husband in bed with his mistress. He makes a small pirouette and says: "Who, me with a mistress? Who said so? Nothing of the sort has happened, and there is no one else here. Everything is all right." In other words, our services are always acting in the same manner. Actually, all intelligence services throughout the world have always denied even the fact that they deal in intelligence. Do you not remember when 105 persons were expelled from London, 100 from New York, and 65 from Paris? All of these were "provocations of Western intelligence services and of the enemies of peace and progress." "What are you saying? Nothing of the sort has ever happened" is a normal reaction. Everyone reacts the same way, the more so because now these are serious and indictable matters. In my view, therefore, no other reaction is possible. I believe that he knows there are no traces—no physical, material traces. However, there are witnesses and, as I have said and am ready to repeat, I could go to Bulgaria and address the court and even name people in the Soviet Union who could shed light on this matter.

[Geshakov] I intended to ask you this question, but now I would like to ask you something else, about yesterday's statement by the KGB public relations center to the effect that all of this is slander and you could be held liable for it in accordance with Soviet law. Could you tell us, should this happen, what kind of defense you intend to put up.

[Kalugin] Look, when one tells the truth, one must tell the whole truth. I shall defend myself only through my knowledge. I shall name the people who participated. I shall describe the circumstances, the way all of this took place because I also am familiar with some other details that I intend to reveal in time. They will leave no doubt in the mind of any objective observer or judge that that was precisely the way it happened. Furthermore, I rely on the fact that, in the final account, the people whom I will name will be able to confirm my statements. I also allow for the fact, naturally, that this will not be Kryuchkov but people on an entirely different level, and I am fully confident of such a happening.

[Geshakov] My assumption is that you have no documentary proof whatsoever, but that is your business, and I shall no longer ask you about anything....

[Kalugin] You realize, I have a bagful of information. Why should I be slandering?

[Geshakov] A few more questions. Recently, reports were published in our press that three generals belonging to the Bulgarian Secret Services apparently destroyed the file on Georgi Markov last February. Do you believe that a copy of this file could be found at the KGB?

[Kalugin] No, I do not. Something may have remained—some traces, for example, of assignments. The chief

instructor on the Soviet side was Sergey Mikhaylovich Golubev. Today he is a general. At that time, he was chief of security in KGB intelligence and it was he who went to Bulgaria as an instructor. I assume that his reports on his travel to Bulgaria have been saved. You know that in our country a paper must be written on absolutely everything. The report probably states that "in connection with the implementation of a special task, Comrade Golubev visited Sofia." The Bulgarians have always acted in that way, learning from their older Soviet brothers, and have destroyed all traces. In the Soviet Union, for example, all materials related to Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and other dissidents have already been destroyed because, should such materials become public knowledge, they would strike a crushing blow at many living and still prospering leaders and KGB heads. They destroy everything—that is, Kryuchkov's team. This can be done also by permission of the superior leadership but, one way or another, it is the KGB that eliminates the tracks. Naturally, Bulgarian intelligence, as well, acts in the same manner. This is commonplace. All intelligence and security services try to destroy any expository material that could be used.

In this connection, I would like to go back to Andropov. He had one quality: Many chiefs write their resolutions under the influence of the moment; when Andropov wrote a resolution, he was thinking with a feeling of historicism, that perhaps 10 to 50 years from now, someone would find this document and read the resolution and understand something. His resolutions were correlated with history in such a way that it is impossible to unravel something and accuse him of lawlessness. This required...

[Geshakov] Professionalism?

[Kalugin] Political wisdom.

[Geshakov] I gather from what you say that there was a close interaction between the Bulgarian and the Soviet Special Services. Let me ask you this: Were there cases in KGB practice in which Bulgarian Special Services conducted an operation of their own within or outside a country and sent reports to the KGB to this effect?

[Kalugin] No such formal reports were made. However, relations between us were so close that virtually not a single major action undertaken by the Bulgarian internal affairs organs—state security was within the framework of the MVR—was unknown to us. We knew everything that was taking place in Bulgaria. Bulgarians, like true brothers and brothers-in-arms, shared everything with us, and we helped them as best we could. Therefore, if we are dealing in the old categories, you could consider this an "act of international solidarity." The more so since it was a request by Comrade Zhivkov. How could one refuse such a then-respected person?

[Geshakov] Oleg Danilovich, lately our press has quite frequently reported that, before 10 November, when the Bulgarian "coup d'état" took place, there was a network of KGB agents in Bulgaria and that these agents had free

access to all establishments and to any type of confidential information and did not have to report their activities to the Bulgarian authorities, and that even to this day such a network exists. The question is: Was there such a network, and does it exist today?

[Kalugin] If it is in the sense that there were KGB agents among Bulgarian citizens, this is untrue. We have always worked on the basis of total trust. There has been no case of working behind the backs of the Bulgarians or the backs of the leadership of the security services. Whatever problems we may have had to resolve, it was always with their participation. They were viewed as almost "family," as members of our own organization. Why should we have had any other agents? If you are thinking of the KGB personnel who worked in the missions in Sofia and Varna, they indeed enjoyed a certain authority and the right granted to them by the Bulgarian MVR to go wherever they wanted. However, these were just a few people. The KGB mission in Bulgaria numbered some 20 persons—no more. This is not something about which we could speak seriously as some kind of power....

[Geshakov] It was not on a big scale?

[Kalugin] No, it was not. However, they indeed had the right to telephone the head of the Second Main Administration, who was an excellent person. His name was...no, I have forgotten it. It does not matter, or else ring up Comrade Shopov. Would he have refused a Soviet comrade something? Let me tell you honestly, from the point of view of cooperation relations, we were comrades-in-arms. There was no need to do something behind each other's backs.

[Geshakov] In conclusion, let me go back to your statement that, if need be, you would come to Bulgaria. As we know, there is currently an investigation in our country of the assassination of Georgi Markov. Are you willing to come here to testify? Is that so?

[Kalugin] Please, I am ready to do this in a Bulgarian or a Soviet court, or in front of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. I am certain that after the KGB publication to the effect that I am slandering that organization, there will be many questions asked by the deputies: How can it be, slanderer, and so forth. I am ready to give them a number of details they will find interesting. Today, in this interview, there is no point in discussing them. Let us leave this for later. Personally, however, I believe that the truth should reach the people because, unless we find the truth, it means that we are unwilling to deal seriously with what our people have believed. We must break with the past and punish those who deserve it. Incidentally, I am not a bloodthirsty person. Nevertheless, even though the leader of the state—I am referring to former President Zhivkov—impudently denies that he bears the full responsibility for what was taking place in the country, he is primarily to blame because it was he who determined what the others should do. Incidentally, let me tell you that the Soviet KGB, in its time, did not like Zhivkov. It did not like him because of his authoritarian

approach and his lack of respect for the people. However, these were private matters. On the official level, everything was all right, and there were no problems. However, our personnel did not like him. Incidentally, this was also the attitude of the Bulgarian MVR. Because of our closeness, some Bulgarian personnel shared with us their view that "Zhivkov is a dictator. This man is not a communist." In other words, even then they had assessed him quite soberly. Naturally, however, all of this was between us. We never reported such matters to anyone because it made no sense to let our friends down. Such was the situation....

[Geshakov] Oleg Danilovich, thank you for this interview.

Moscow, 3 April 1991

DPS Leader Calls for Tolerance for Minorities

AU0305153091 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 26 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Prof. Dimitur Sepetliev, member of the Central Council of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS): "The 'Turkish Danger' and the Nationality Issue in Bulgaria"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] One of the most preposterous accusations against the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] is related to the argument that the DPS allegedly encourages some of the Rhodope Turks [or the so-called Bulgarian Muslims] to adopt a Turkish identity and tries to establish joint cultural and political organizations with them. This particular accusation is based on total ignorance of the causes of certain historical events. It is true that this particular ethnic group has a tendency to adopt a Turkish identity. It can be observed that the group in question shows a preference for Turkish language studies, for example. (This is symptomatic of its assimilation by another ethnic group—namely, the Bulgarian Turks). Nevertheless, the trend was not prompted by the DPS but is a result of the current policy on the nationality issue in our country. This policy divides the different ethnic groups into Bulgarian and non-Bulgarian groups. The second category is considered inferior. The rights of this group may be violated and are actually violated as a matter of course. At the same time, however, its equal rights are constantly emphasized for propaganda purposes. Whenever events contradict the propaganda, however, they are followed by declarations that there are no separate nations or ethnic groups at all in Bulgaria and that Bulgaria is a single-nation country. A top-ranking Bulgarian statesman even declared so in public during one of his recent visits abroad, which gave rise to amazement and ironical smiles among his audience. The declaration of this particular statesman, however, prompted the Prosecutor's Office and the other juridical organs in the country to ask the following eclectic [eklekticheski] question: Can the culprits responsible for the national revival process be prosecuted on the basis of Article 416 of the Penal Code (on genocide affecting nationalities and ethnic and religious groups) if

Bulgaria is a single-nation country? It is a strange question, indeed, particularly for all those who suffered from the national revival process, and for our entire democratic public.

As a matter of fact, the policy of genocide and assimilation continues in our country. The moratorium that was imposed on the introduction of Turkish language lessons in schools, the refusal to restore the forcibly confiscated property of Bulgarian citizens who emigrated to Turkey, the inadequate health care and poor-quality education provided for the areas populated by minorities, the fact that the Labor Corps is mainly recruited from the aforementioned areas, and numerous other facts confirm my conclusions. Precisely for this reason, certain minority groups find a solution for their unjust treatment by adopting a Turkish identity. The process developed spontaneously. It was a reaction to the national revival process and to the continued assimilation policy of the Bulgarian authorities, and also a response to the recently established "Razgrad Republic." It is a reaction to the increasing Greater-Bulgarian chauvinism and nationalistic propaganda. A political organization as such, irrespective of its strength, is incapable of instigating such a mass reaction, particularly one expressed in such a specific manner. This process can only be explained on the basis of a thorough and detailed knowledge of the theory of the nationality issue. This applies, for example, to the question of what ethnic groups actually represent and by which factors they are determined; it applies to the question of when and under what circumstances ethnic groups become national groups and further develop into nationalities; it applies to the question of what national self-awareness actually represents and which historical events contribute to its formation, and so forth. Generally speaking, the question is much too complicated and does not allow any unqualified explanations. It should be interpreted on the basis of high-level intellectual theory, rather than in a spirit of party bias. Only after a full clarification of the problem will we be able to express our state policy on the nationality issue. In the meantime, tolerance rather than confrontation is called for. This is the case because confrontation involves unpleasant situations, not only for the victims and those affected, but also for the perpetrators.

Last, but not least, I would like to comment on the statement by DPS leader Medi [Ahmed] Dogan that acquired such great notoriety. I am referring to his statement that Bulgaria's road to Europe goes through the Bosphorus. This highly criticized and often misinterpreted phrase means only one thing—namely, that Bulgaria would not be worthy of joining the highly civilized and noble community of European states as long as it has not resolved its nationality issue in a correct and totally democratic spirit. Unfortunately, this has not happened to date. [passage omitted]

Nationalist Foundation Established

91BA0471A Sofia ZORA Bulgarian 5 Mar 91 p 7

[Article by Romyana Velikova: "The St. Dimitur Solunski Foundation Is for the Revival of Bulgarian National Self-Awareness"]

[Text] The St. Dimitur Solunski Foundation was registered in the Veliko Turnovo okrug court in January. Its founders—the Bulgarian National Democratic Party, the Vuzrazhdane [Revival] National Movement, and the Veliko Turnovo VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization]—already have a working statute and program. The foundation has been laid. What are the motives, the initial tasks, and the outlook? These questions were answered by Mr. Plamen Rusev, the foundation secretary.

The economic and social catastrophe has been painfully reflected on the self-esteem and self-awareness of Bulgarians. In spite of this, there are still no attempts to assess the problem, or measures planned to control it. Public and political organizations that dealt with it were quickly labeled nationalistic. Because everything has been a result of the structure imposed after September 1944, it is our opinion that we are able, even though with difficulty, to overcome the spiritual crisis.

The centuries-old upholder of the Bulgarian national spirit—the church—was one of the most oppressed institutions. It is precisely for this reason that Christian virtues must be revived first of all. It was an honor for the foundation's board that the Right Reverend Bishop Ilarion of Tryavopol, vicar of the Holy Veliko Turnovo Bishopric, accepted the invitation to become honorary chairman. The board elected Associate Prof. Dimitur Vitanov as chairman. The responsibilities assumed by the general director, Ilian Nikolov, research associate in engineering, should also be noted for their merit.

The foundation's leadership will seek to secure appropriate organizational and financial conditions for the development of activities that confirm Bulgarian national self-awareness. It will cooperate with educational establishments, and will aid and finance scholarly activities, the preservation of cultural and historical memorials, and generally everything related to the protection of national dignity.

It is not by chance that the foundation is headquartered in Veliko Turnovo, a symbolic city. It was here that Asen and his followers revived the Bulgarian kingdom. This is why one of our goals is to establish conditions to increase Veliko Turnovo's prestige before the world society, so that it can take its place among the cultural and historical centers of Europe.

The foundation's first task is the total restoration and sanctification of the St. Dimitur Solunski Church in the Asen neighborhood. We are led not only by true necessity, but also by the profound symbolism of this act. Every temple is a center of spirituality, of contact

between man and God. At least, it is a pity for a temple such as this one to be locked up except for tourist visits. This is the place from which a revived Bulgaria started, while our city emerged from obscurity to become Staroslavniya Tsarevgrad Turnov [Old Glorious King's City of Turnov]. By sanctifying the temple, we hope to sanctify a new beginning for all of us.

St. Dimitur Solunski will probably be the first temple sanctified since 1944.

The financial beginning was established by the founders through modest donations. We hope that all patriots will not hesitate to give their financial support to the future of their city and Bulgaria. We believe that public and economic organizations and firms will also consider the need to support the foundation's activities.

Perhaps of interest is the condition in the statute where every donor of more than 50,000 leva will become a member of the foundation's board. We plan to publish a periodic bulletin with the names of donors. The foundation's board will be responsible for managing and increasing the fund, using various economic mechanisms. The donations are guaranteed by the statute. We depend especially on citizens who will phone us with suggestions and questions at 2-15-41 or 2-35-28, or will send them to the following address: Veliko Turnovo, Post Office Box 170.

Federation of Bulgarians Abroad Outlines Aims

AU0805182991 Sofia BTA in English 1657 GMT
8 May 91

[Text] Sofia, May 8 (BTA)—The Federation of the Bulgarians Living Abroad is an independent, democratic and non-political organization seeking to preserve and develop the spiritual, cultural, social and economic ties of the Bulgarians living abroad with their homeland. It has the ambition to promote contacts between the Bulgarian emigres in all countries and to help preserve the Bulgarian language, traditions and customs. The organization also intends to represent and defend the interests of the Bulgarians living abroad in Bulgaria. The immediate task of the organization is to help more than 1,000 people restore their Bulgarian citizenship, Mr. Atanas Aleksandrov, chairman of the federation, said. The first issue of the "BULGARI" newspaper of the federation has come out.

Mr. Aleksandrov stressed that despite the non-political nature of the federation, its members share the ideas of the Union of Democratic Forces.

HUNGARY

SZDSZ Head Views Need for New Government

91CH0469A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
9 Mar 91 p 15

[Article by Janos Kis: "One More Try"]

[Text] The coalition that governs Hungary is in a state of chaos. Whether it will be able to fulfill the four-year

mandate that it received is not at all certain. For every democratic opposition power there emerges the solemn question of what to support: keeping the government alive or opening the way for an orderly change of government.

Whether we choose one or the other, we assume a tremendous responsibility. The former is very risky because it may happen that the government remains in office until no one is capable of surmounting the chaos by democratic means. But the latter is dangerous, too, because the government's premature departure could launch a series of debacles that likewise leads to chaos and the collapse of democracy.

A decision is unavoidable, because the coalition's incoherence and paralysis is a fact. However, it is extremely important that the opposition's political conduct rest on responsible reflection, not ingrained habits or passions of the moment. Cases for both the first and second alternatives must be weighed with the greatest possible subjectivity.

Let us first examine the argument that the opposition pursue a policy of allowing the government to remain in office.

The Weakness of Democracy

Not only is the government unstable, the entire democratic order is tenebrous. The change of regime occurred in the midst of a profound economic crisis. Inflation is rampant, unemployment mounts by leaps and bounds, and the great divisions of state verge on collapse.

The problem can only be solved by painful intervention. The state budget and the country's solvency must be attended. Rapid change must occur in the sphere of ownership. However, output must be curtailed in those branches where the world market expresses no demand. The role of state reallocation must be further reduced. All of this causes serious social tension and imposes new economic burdens on most of the population.

It is difficult for a country to tolerate so much turmoil even when the people strongly identify with their leaders. When the Mazowiecki government announced its stabilization program about a year ago, it was aware of the enormous moral capital that Solidarity had accumulated in its 10-year struggle. Society had confidence in the government and accepted the severest measures without complaint. Yet the decade was so lean that the reserves of confidence were exhausted. Mazowiecki suffered a crushing electoral defeat at the hands of Walesa who, appealing to the rising discontent, launched his campaign for the post of president. And to no avail did Walesa pursue his opponent's economic policy after the victory. During the campaign, the Solidarity trade union

parted company with the government and now dissociates itself from unpopular and what it calls unnecessary measures. (The results can already be seen in the rising wage-price spiral.)

From the political viewpoint, the situation is even more troublesome in Hungary. It is true that restoring the economy in our country does not require measures as drastic as those in Poland. But confidence in the government is much lower here.

The powerful mass movement that created Hungarian democracy is not comparable to Solidarity. Hungarian society participated in the overthrow of the Kadar regime, but for the most part, not by active opposition or organized political activity. Society simply turned its back on the government when the latter could no longer guarantee the material standard of living to which society was accustomed.

It is true that the public has pinned its hopes on the change of regime. But the public is still not unconditionally in tune with the spirit of democracy, democracy for its own sake. Absent is the feeling that we saved the republic, thus it is ours. Absent is the conviction, which is spawned only by participating in political struggles, that it is worthwhile to make additional sacrifices in order to stabilize democracy.

Identification with the new Hungary is conditional and is linked, even in the short run, to the system's economic success. The people have little patience; the leaders, parties, and institutions of the new democracy do not have much public confidence at their disposal.

Also absent is the binding and stabilizing power of political tradition. The stronger parties are all very young, and no party can rely on traditions of family, profession, or neighborhood to keep a majority of voters in its camp during a period of temporary setbacks.

Most parties that enter the government can quickly lose one-half to two-thirds of their constituents. Several small parties can turn into one large party overnight, only perhaps to disintegrate anew. Ardent supporters of a party may abandon politics completely at a moment's notice.

Thus, each party is at the mercy of the public's slightest whim. Yet the public is jolted by enormous disappointments, and the latter can sweep away any political power.

It is easy to see how dangerous this situation is. If the Antall government falls, it will be difficult to form a new one from the current parliament. After all, the balance of forces enormously restricts the possibilities of forming a coalition. Yet moving up the elections threatens to reduce cooperation, and the regime's legitimacy is further enfeebled.

But the real danger lies in society's perception that it can force the departure of an unpopular government at any time. In stable democracies, a government that has

become unpopular is rejected in the next scheduled elections, after its term has expired. Only in exceptions does it occur that elections are moved up or that a government's makeup is altered without new elections. It would be inauspicious if the first democratically elected government and the parliament were to meet this fate.

It is quite possible, though not certain, that one advanced election and one fallen government would follow another. Weak governments would be interchangeable, the makeup of the parliament would change swiftly and substantially, and demagogic elements would rise from obscurity to form most coalitions, until finally, the country would be dissatisfied with the parliamentary system the way it was.

Government Coalition's Incompetence

These are very serious considerations. Yet the other side also makes very weighty arguments.

The Antall government undergoes a two-pronged attack. It is criticized because its political ambitions conflict with liberal democracy. It tries its hand at recentralizing power, it plays a squeeze-out game with the opposition in the parliament, it invokes the personality of the Horthy era, and it attempts to promote state ideology.

I am one of those who usually opposes such experiments by the coalition. But it is one thing to attack the government's ambitions and another thing to declare that it is undesirable for the government to remain in office. After all, the danger of collapse of parliamentary democracy is in the balance. We must therefore make it very clear where we really stand.

Between 1945 and 1948, the Communist Party eliminated all traces of parliamentary democracy. After 1948, it was no longer possible to believe that new elections would bring another party into the government and that defects in the system would thereby be corrected. Do we maintain that the current government, during the four years at its disposal, could create such an irreversible situation?

If we do, then we could immediately draw the conclusion that the current government must step down. After all, it would be a choice between the certain elimination of democracy and the danger of the undeniable but avoidable collapse of democracy.

In my opinion, such concern is not unwarranted. It is reasonable to make such a far-reaching claim. Parliamentary democracy has lines of defense that the government may not overstep. For the sake of truth, we must add that it is not the government's goal to abolish existing political institutions. It merely strives to tip the balance of power in its favor at the expense of the parliament and the municipalities.

This power shift is unpropitious from democracy's viewpoint, but not irreparable. It is reasonable to oppose the shift with all constitutional means and reasonable to do

everything to eliminate it after the next elections (including amending important laws). But it is not reasonable in itself for us to embrace the more serious dangers that accompany the government's premature exit.

However, there is another aspect to criticism of the government. Essentially, it is that the Antall government is incapable of stabilizing the situation. The government is at the mercy of smallholder coalition partners that are unpredictable and prone to extremist views. The philosophical conflicts between the top economic ministers becomes more pronounced. Absent is the solid support of the largest government party, and setbacks have caused deep dissension within the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]. The MDF's parliamentary group is divided and finds it extremely hard to tolerate the government's unpopularity. The MDF attracted voters with an economic program that, in action at least, it has since been forced to repudiate. The drop in popularity has prompted it, by way of substitution, to threaten repeatedly an anticommunist purge, with which it has frightened off the state apparatus.

Since the government took office, perhaps its one successful move has been the appointment of Mihaly Kupa as minister of finance. Kupa is accepted by the public, supported by the press, and respected by the opposition. His statements of purpose are closer to the liberal economic consensus than those of any other government spokesman thus far. I wonder if it follows that a sudden change is to be expected in the government's performance.

No signs of change are evident. One good minister is not enough. A united and resolute government is necessary, a well-oiled governmental apparatus, a strong parliamentary and extraparlimentary basis. There is no sign of any of these things. Kupa was already head of the government's economic cabinet when the compensation law was submitted to the parliament without a preliminary agreement between the coalition partners. And this is just a single example, though a very important one. The turmoil has not diminished. The government has not managed to break out of its state of impotence and paralysis.

This state in itself is dangerous to the democratic order. Just one of the lurking dangers is that the despondent and disillusioned masses may sweep away the government. I personally do not consider it likely that a protest movement of such force will emerge in this country. However, we must take this slight possibility into account because if it does come to pass, irreparable things will happen. If the government is overthrown by the man on the street, then the entire constitutional order falls apart, and it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to put it back together again.

Still, there exists another danger whose likelihood is much greater, namely, the government is not overthrown but the pressure on it mounts to such a degree that it raises budget outlays and opens the way for wage hikes.

One local strike, one local demonstration, triggers another, and the government will not have the moral or political strength to oppose it. The upshot is nothing less than galloping inflation, disarrangement of economic processes, and accompanying political disintegration. If this government survives for three years or departs prematurely, the same danger exists.

Government and Opposition

The present government can hold its own only if nothing changes within the coalition. If the stormy marriage between the Forum and the Smallholder Party remains intact, if the unexplained symbiosis of trends and factions that constitute the Forum remain untouched. The slightest disturbance in the status quo could mean the end of the government. On the other hand, the government's departure could make it possible to transcend the political status quo that evolves after the elections. Not only are there genuinely serious dangers but also some chance of escape.

It must be clearly understood that the opposition parties are in no position to oust the government by parliamentary means. The current coalition received almost a 60-percent majority in the elections, and as long as it holds together, the government cannot be dismissed.

The question of what to choose in the weighty dilemma sketched above is not at all superfluous, indeed, it is unavoidable. There are no grounds for assuming that the coalition will remain invincible under the growing pressure of public opinion. We would have reason to expect this only if we believed that the coalition parties and parliamentary groups consisted of persons who thumb their nose at public opinion and concern themselves with nothing more than whether they have the necessary majority when it is time for the parliament to vote. If this is not the case, and I am convinced that it is not, then the coalition will sooner or later react to the crisis.

However, we must prepare for this. If we say we do not consider it desirable for the Antall government to remain in power, we can begin to debate publicly how the situation might be handled when the government departs. We can begin to gather information and get ready to soften the subsequent blows of transition.

Surprisingly enough, this turn of events will not necessarily damage the relationship between the opposition and government parties. On the contrary, the adversary relationship between the coalition and opposition parties, especially the MDF and the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], has become part of the status quo. As long as we are preoccupied with maintaining the status quo, we cannot hope to rectify this relationship.

This government has never been inclined to dissociate itself from that wing of the MDF that equates the Forum with the people, and the Free Democratic rivals with the antipopular minority. This government has not confronted the hostility to banks, capital, foreigners, and newspapers that spews forth from MDF populist circles.

It merely tries to subordinate itself to a genteel, prestigious, and stabler conservatism. If this symbiosis lasts, the relationship between the MDF and Free Democratic opponents will not become one of loyalty. On the other hand, if there is a power shakeup within the MDF, then there may be a slight chance for normalizing relations between the two parties. This, of course, requires extraordinary tact and self-restraint from both sides, because the situation is very precarious. But the alternative, maintaining the political status quo, means that we are quite assuredly burdened by vicious cycles of hostility. That in itself would be enough to completely paralyze parliamentary institutions.

Parliamentary or Presidential System?

I would like to stop at this point. I am not concerned with what steps would help lead us to a new and stronger government, to a parliament more efficient than the current one. By way of conclusion, I would merely like to brush aside a skeptical objection.

Each of the two alternatives outlined above is laden with so many dangers that it is easy to formulate the idea that the difference between them is negligible. The conclusion is quite obvious: The parliamentary system has failed in Hungary, and the only solution is to switch over to a presidential government.

"Parliamentary democracy deserves as many tries as it has received." This is the verdict of a NEPSZABADSAG article's author (former chairman of MDF's election campaign) who, alluding to the examples of France and the United States, claims that the presidential system can also be a form of democracy.

I do not want to become enmeshed here in a debate on the limits of the parliamentary system or the nature of the power wielded by French and American presidents. I consider the essential issue to be whether a possible presidential system in Hungary would really be comparable to a French or American democracy or to a Latin American dictatorship, whether a popular leader who bids for presidential power would become a Hungarian de Gaulle or a Hungarian Peron.

I consider the latter more likely. Under the conditions that now exist in Hungary, throughout the entire country, the temptation is very great to turn a strong president into a populist dictator. Very weak are the social constraints that would keep the president within the bounds of constitutional democracy. Nor is there any guarantee that stabilization of the economy and transformation of ownership rules would be more successful in a presidential regime than in a democratic framework. In any case, a dictatorship would hinder political development and inflict more suffering on society.

That is why I think that parliamentary democracy still deserves one more try.

Internal Discord Within MDF Analyzed*91CH0534B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
28 Mar 91 p 7*

[Article by Tamas Fricz: "What Direction Will the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] Take?"]

[Text] If anyone wanted to write an article about the internal conditions of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the definitive party of the ruling coalition, it would be important to avoid biased statements and oversimplifications. I aim to do so in this article.

But why would it be so important to emphasize objectivity exactly with respect to the MDF? This is important because in recent months, actually on a permanent basis ever since they assumed power, the ruling coalition, and eminently the MDF have been under the cross fire of evaluations. As months passed, these assessments and evaluations became increasingly polarized, they went into extremes on occasion. In many respects this makes it impossible to obtain an objective picture of the direction the possible transformation that the MDF will take.

This is so, even though in the course of evaluating the MDF we should emphasize the fact that the leading party of the ruling coalition is strongly divided internally and that its activities are wrought with conflicts between principles and practice. The events of recent weeks may best prove the truth of this statement: The MDF faction initiated a grass roots "self-purifying" process in order to change the party's parliamentary activities to a much more restrained, and according to statements, a more constructive course of political action. (Incidentally, compared to the Alliance of Free Democrats general meeting a few weeks earlier in which Janos Kis declared that the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] henceforth regards itself as an opponent of the ruling coalition, the MDF initiative was a surprisingly self-restrained endeavor. It indicated that the MDF would not pick up the glove thrown to its feet by the SZDSZ.)

If we intend to say more about division within the MDF, I should quickly point out the simultaneous existence of several kinds of divisions within the MDF. This fact has always been publicly acknowledged by MDF leaders. Jozsef Antall gave lengthy descriptions of this matter a number of times, i.e., that the party has been divided on the basis of political ideologies. According to this delineation, there exists a national liberal trend (whose leading personality is Gy. Csaba Kiss), a Christian democratic faction (prominently represented by Jozsef Antall), and a populist-national trend (we may consider Istvan Csurka and Denes Csegey to belong to this faction, although I would add that there are huge differences between Zoltan Biro's populist trend and the national trend advocated by Csegey). At the same time party leaders also stress the fact that representatives of these trends are comfortable with each other and that there is no real threat of a party rift.

I do not believe that conflicts between these political trends should be underestimated. Such conflicts peak in differences between national liberalism and national conservatism. But the MDF's functional problems do not originate solely from conflicting trends, but mainly from the fact that signs of functional division appeared within the party.

Just what does functional division mean? It means that the party is supposed to perform certain functions, and apparently the performance of these functions produces different, mutually diverse political strategies. This then creates discord in the entire operation of the party.

To begin with, there exists within the party a stratum which creates politics, which is supposed to mold the party's political profile. MDF leaders in the cabinet, in the parliament, and in the MDF "movement" play a role in this. Truly, ideological conflicts have emerged with respect to politics, or more accurately, within the stratum which performs the political function. The conflict is not between the three officially designated trends, but decisively between the national liberalism and national conservatism I mentioned already. Undoubtedly, the MDF and the entire ruling coalition is held together by a nationalistic outlook, but the societal foundation for this outlook is debatable: To what extent should a nationalistic outlook represent old values and old institutions (a kind of rightwing outlook), alternatively, to what extent should the country simply endeavor to implement modernization commensurate with the given peculiar features of the country (which means liberalism). The struggle between these two trends is yet to be decided. Much depends on the kinds of forces that come to the forefront from within other functional strata of the MDF.

The other functional stratum is the professional bureaucracy. It essentially performs the functions of governance, the tasks of the state administration, from ministers on down to the newly appointed MDF directors. It appears that the leading stratum of bureaucrats became less and less ideologically oriented particularly since the cabinet reshuffle (Kupa's emergence) late last year, and that this stratum has acquired an increasingly pragmatic outlook. Persons like Bela Kadar (it matters not whether a given minister is a member of the MDF), like Peter Akos Bod or Mihaly Kupa react not to the least to ideological battles along the lines of conservatism and liberalism. All they try to do is to provide professionally well-founded answers to issues which arise at the governmental level.

As I have said many times, we have, of course, an awful lot of problems with the performance of the MDF government, nevertheless, the leading stratum in government cannot be accused to the least of forcing the acceptance of a certain Christian-national ideology. And let us not forget that the fate of the MDF as a party is closely tied to the fate of the government. Accordingly, if we chose to be optimistic we could hope that from an ideological standpoint the professional bureaucracy

might exert a "sobering" effect on the party's operations as a whole. They may inject some well-perceived pragmatism into thought processes within the MDF.

The logic of the third functional stratum, the cultured, literary group with an emotional outlook, is completely different from that of the professional bureaucracy. It strongly influences the conflicts within the political stratum. Beyond dispute, these literary "arch buffalos" are closely linked to the establishment of the MDF at Lakitelek. It is equally beyond dispute that among the prominent representatives of this stratum, a certain antidemocratic form of this national outlook manifests itself strongly. Among them the "identifying" intent of national feelings shifts over to the intent to concentrate power, to force a certain style on others. One must not underestimate the significance of this trend and of this stratum.

At the same time, we must not forget that whatever these people have to say pertains mainly to cultural life and to emotions, and that they are less able to comment on economic modernization. The opportunities available to the literary-emotional stratum and style may become limited as long as economic and social modernization has primary significance in the MDF, and I hope that this is true. An emotional approach is not much worth in deciding the "ultimate" issues. A certain professional rationale must prevail instead, failing that the MDF could instantly regard itself a loser.

Finally, I regard the MDF membership itself as the fourth stratum. This is the "dark horse," one really cannot tell exactly what it wants. Based on my limited experience I am able to state that contrary to the title of the movie, I have yet to meet a happy MDF member. This is true, even though this unhappiness is not caused by the possibility that the party's Christian-national outlook or conservatism becomes too unbearable. It much rather seems that MDF members were not made of some special material like Rakosi's communists were in those days. MDF members are dissatisfied as a result of the same problems as the large majority of the people are. This means that objections to the standard of living and to matters related to the economy dominate, i.e., they are dissatisfied with the government's inability to act, and with the senseless and inconceivable debate that transpires in the parliament. Accordingly, if the membership is at all capable of influencing the MDF leadership in some direction (because, after all, a hard rift may be discovered between the party elite and the membership), such influence may take shape only in a call for more efficient and more productive governance and for an orientation toward action instead of superfluous debate.

Accordingly, I feel that within the MDF the above four functional strata jointly formulate the party's policies by injecting their own particular concerns and rationale. This also means that within the party some diverse thoughts confront each other, and that for the time being

we cannot predict the consequences of these confrontations. One thing is certain nevertheless: Trying to understand the ongoing processes within the MDF purely on the basis of examining only one (let's say the literary) or another (let's say the professional bureaucratic) stratum's manifestations is untenable. In good conscience we cannot say that the MDF and the government are consistent in every respect with European standards, nor can we say that the party in power is consistently arch conservative in every respect.

In the course of a debate one of our noted political scientists said that a dynamic, not a static, party structure is functioning in Hungary, one that is still in the process of transformation. This is entirely true with respect to the MDF as a whole, and whether the MDF becomes a conserving or a modernizing political force will be decided in one or another direction as a result of the functioning of the party system (and the political system) as a whole, and not solely by virtue of the intentions of the MDF.

New Serbian, Slovene Newspapers Published

AU0805135391

[Editorial Report] Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian of 3 May on page 4 carries a 200-word unattributed report on the publication of new Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene newspapers in Hungary, under the headline: "New Southern Slav Weeklies in Hungary."

MAGYAR NEMZET reports that the association of Serbs in Hungary "has published a new weekly in Cyrillic script" entitled SZPRSZKE NARODNE. This title could be translated as the Serbian People's Newspaper. MAGYAR NEMZET also notes that a "Slovene newspaper is being edited in Szentgotthard and printed in Muraszombat." According to MAGYAR NEMZET, this Slovene newspaper is entitled PORABJE. This title could be translated as Raba Basin.

YUGOSLAVIA

SFRY Presidency Member Drnovsek Interviewed

91BA0557A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Apr 91 p 4

[Interview with SFRY Presidency member Janez Drnovsek by Bozo Masanovic; place and date not given: "Slovenia Is Interesting, but the World Is Waiting To See What the Outcome of the Yugoslav Dissension Is Like"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 10 April—The two-day talks by Slovenia's representative in the Federal Assembly, Dr. Janez Drnovsek, with the leading officials of international institutions located in Geneva, among other things brought two specific agreements which are extremely interesting for the Slovene economy. The World Economic Forum [WEF], a prestigious international institution, the members of which are the most prominent commercial firms, banks, and institutions, is prepared to allow our republic to present its economic possibilities

and plans—and, what's more—at its prominent annual meeting, which is organized each year in Davos.

[Masanovic] Is this the first tangible breakthrough by Slovenia on the international scene?

[Drnovsek] We are obviously becoming more and more interesting. Regardless of how the Yugoslav crisis will be resolved, our partners think that in a few months we will be very interesting. If there is a new Yugoslav agreement, it will be interesting as an example of solving an inter-ethnic problem in the midst of the political and economic reforms that are taking place in Eastern and Central Europe. If such an agreement does not happen, and Slovenia becomes fully independent instead, it will be even more interesting for foreign countries as it will be the first case of a new independent state in Europe. The promotion in Davos has economic and media importance for Slovenia, since prominent figures always gather at the meetings organized by the WEF.

[Masanovic] Does the WEF's increased interest in Slovenia perhaps mean that our republic is a sort of test case in the eyes of the Geneva institution, in view of other independence plans in Europe—for instance, in the Baltic states?

[Drnovsek] If Slovenia achieves its independence, it will be the first case of the fulfillment of such aspirations, and it will be interesting for that reason. It will be less attractive for the WEF, and also other international institutions, if nothing happens in the coming months. In that case, they will all keep waiting, and a meeting probably will not be held in Ljubljana either. The situation as it is today will not interest business and professional circles. What is important to them is the result, i.e., emergence from the crisis, regardless of whether there will be a new agreement or the appearance of a new independent state.

[Masanovic] How does the WEF view the situation here?

[Drnovsek] All the international institutions that I visited in Geneva are interested in the situation in our country, they accept it, and they are also quite familiar with it. Almost no one is venturing to predict what the outcome will be.

[Masanovic] Which of the options for resolving the Yugoslav crisis would be the most acceptable to your interlocutors?

[Drnovsek] All of them are still more or less hoping that there will be some sort of Yugoslav agreement, no matter what it is like, as long as it is democratic and acceptable to everyone. Any variant of such an agreement, including one based on considerably more autonomy for the republics than in the past, seems acceptable to them. They still have a preference for this, because they would like to see Yugoslavia as an international entity, and thus it is hard for them to imagine anything else. They are also

showing understanding for Slovenia's situation, and for that reason they will accept the solutions that we decide upon ourselves.

[Masanovic] What are the possibilities for beginning institutional cooperation, for instance, with the EFTA [European Free Trade Association]? Our negotiations on free trade have been blocked.

[Drnovsek] Our internal situation is certainly influencing the negotiations with the EFTA. The organization's secretary general, Georg Reisch, was very frank, and said that the EFTA's members were waiting to see what state entity they would have to deal with, and with whom they could conclude an agreement on a free trade zone, with the present state or with several partners. They can hardly be expected to enter into an agreement when everything is still completely open. Reisch admitted that for that reason they were deliberately dragging out the negotiations, but at the same time he posed a very simple question: If we in Yugoslavia cannot ensure free trade within the country because of the Serbian blockade of Slovene products and other cases, how will we be able to do it with the EFTA countries?

[Masanovic] Consequently, nothing can be done until the Yugoslav crisis is resolved?

[Drnovsek] During the visit to Geneva, we tried to settle the issue of using money in the EFTA's fund for the development of Yugoslav small and medium-sized enterprises. The fund has been blocked, and although the formal reasons are different, the substantive hindrances are obviously the same ones, namely, waiting for the internal situation in Yugoslavia to be settled. If that is the obstacle, we could study the possibility of distributing the fund's money among the republics, since our economy needs investments, and possibly in the case of the fund it would not be necessary to wait for a final political solution, but instead they could try to find temporary measures that would allow the republics to use the money from the above-mentioned financial mechanism.

[Masanovic] Does it seem to you that the EFTA would be prepared to conclude free trade agreements with the individual Yugoslav republics as well?

[Drnovsek] Not with the republics, but the situation would change if new states emerged. The EFTA can hardly commit itself to this; its response depends on what the members will say, what their attitude toward the new states is like, and whether they recognize them or not. In the talks I mentioned a possibility that has been indicated in the negotiations on a new Yugoslav federation, that the republics, especially Slovenia, which is most emphasizing such an aspiration, would become independent international entities, at least in certain treaties in which they are particularly interested. That option is present in the internal Yugoslav discussions, and in a certain way we have already been testing the response of foreign partners to such a possibility.

Our interlocutors, of course, cannot give a clear answer yet. They maintain that what we ourselves are able to agree upon will be acceptable to them. If we accomplish that, there will probably not be any problems in agreements with foreign partners. As far as Slovenia is concerned, it will soon have to make a final decision on whether it wants to be independent or stay within Yugoslavia, since as long as there is no clear decision, it will be difficult or almost impossible to conclude agreements in the name of Yugoslavia or even independent agreements. Neither option is working yet, and that is why we are in an extremely uncomfortable position.

[Masanovic] The EFTA has postponed the next phase of the free trade negotiations until mid-May, when there will be a change in the Federal Presidency. What will happen with the negotiations if the present crisis continues?

[Drnovsek] It will be very uncomfortable for us if there is no agreement on resolving the crisis in a short period, i.e., within several months. In that case what individual republics will do is completely open, especially for Slovenia, which has its plebiscitary commitments, i.e., to establish independence by the end of June. A continuation of the present situation would lead to a very complicated situation within the country, and therefore in that case it would be even more necessary to achieve temporary agreements with organizations like the EFTA, in order to allow the republics to obtain investments and keep their economies functioning.

Discussion of New Technology Policy

91BA0440A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
26 Mar 91 p 10

[Article by Z. Perovic: "What Paper on New Technology Policy in Yugoslavia Proposes: Smarter Instead of Better in Future"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The foundation of future technology policy is the Fund for Research and Promotion of Technological Development; closer cooperation with EEC and OECD foreseen

Recently the SIV [Federal Executive Council] came out with "Foundations of a New Technology Policy," which fits in with the federal premier's reformist philosophy, and which was generated according to the model of relationships as they exist in the European Economic Community. Foundations of a New Technology Policy, about which we spoke recently with Dr. Radmilo Kiprianov, deputy federal minister for development, takes off from the earlier strategy, but is far more activist.

At the beginning of the last decade serious consideration was given to an attempt to pull Yugoslavia out of the ever-deepening chasm into which it had obstinately fallen, to both halting an inflationary spiral run wild, and to starting up real processes for reconstructing an obsolete and anachronistic economy. The first significant step in that direction was taken through the leadership of

the Federal Ministry for Science and Technology which worked out a strategy for the technological development of Yugoslavia. In that strategy was drawn a picture of the country's technology at the time, potential and attainable levels of performance were ascertained, accessible directions of strategic development were determined. In a policy conceived in this fashion, a significant place was accorded to the Fund for Promotion of the Country's Technological Development. Its objective was connecting up the broken networks of linkages between scientific research and development organizations and the economy.

However, the strategy suffered from the same deficiencies as previous attempts. It did not speak to the spirit of the times, and did not enable planned technological progress due to a lack of systemic solutions, the lack of an environment in which it could be accomplished, and the lack of long settled-on social goals. So that attempt, though announced as market-determined, inevitably amounted to flirtation with an unattainable fairy-tale prince who rides down other roads, but not ours.

Due to purchase of obsolete, dirty technology in volume, nearly virgin countryside was seriously assaulted. The consequences of such development are visible today in the Bar, Zenica, Tuzla, Trbovlje, Pancevo, Titova Mitrovica, Pljevlje type of eco-gulags: destroyed, near dead rivers and forests. Neither was anticipated economic revival accomplished while the country, because of high debt and low economic efficiency, and a raw materials-based structure of production, plunged into deep economic crisis.

The basic goal of the new science and technology policy that the federal government is recommending is development of scientific and technical potential, and the acquisition, utilization, transfer, and dissemination of technology. Brought into the heart of the battle to increase competitiveness is the enterprise, which has a significant role in stimulating the utilization of existing technologies as well as the development of new technologies. A special place is also given to the sector for research, development and training in the acquisition of indigenous technologies. The areas of implementation of the future technology policy are: the economy, structural innovation, research strategy, international cooperation, and public acquisition and protection of intellectual property. Variants that have been worked out are market-oriented, though not absolutely, and they are dependent on the outcome of the political discussions on the country's future, because the republics have an important, if not crucial place in decisionmaking. This model counts not only on high-tech production, but also on raising the overall and technological level of medium-sized and small enterprises. Importing technology and domestic development are not pitted against each other but are complementary. During the next 15 years Yugoslavia would count on application of today's commercially developed technologies as well as further adaptation of new technologies.

The basic mechanisms for the technology policy, which will lead to a smarter rather than better future, are as follows: The Fund for Promotion of Research and Technological Development will promote, in particular, the precompetitive stages of cooperative research programs, strategic projects, microelectronics dissemination, integrated quality control, building up scientific and innovative structures, and a program of scientific and technical advanced training abroad. Since everything will be done only when there is money, the financial mechanisms are worked out in quite concrete fashion. Standing out among them is the introduction of enterprise capital into the financing of research and technology adaptation, stock issue, and other forms of capital participation. So that technological development will not depend exclusively on banks, which distrust novelty, the SIV will initiate the establishment of a Public Enterprise for Financing Innovative Projects, as well as an Agency for Technological Development. The acquisition of new knowledge will be promoted through tax policy measures and tax breaks. Among new items in the future technology policy, the closer cooperation foreseen with the EEC and OECD merits special attention. As in Europe, the federal government's aim is to direct at least 4 percent of our social product to research and technological development. Today's figure 0.46 percent. In the area of international cooperation special attention is paid to the so-called Program 100 concerning ongoing education of young technical cadres in the world. We are talking about a model that lined up South Korea among the leading industrial powers. Also among the new items are the formation of a Council for Technology to be headed by the president of the SIV and the introduction of technology attaches in embassies located in the most developed countries.

[Box, p 10]

Buying Like There Was No Tomorrow

Not so long ago, and during the "God-given period of self-management socialism," as one satirist remarked, when the state was nonchalantly incurring tens of billions of dollars of debt, in just one 10-year period 1,300,000 licenses and patents, no more, no less, were bought, on which between 4 and 6 billion borrowed dollars were spent.

Although through this great amount of purchasing the Yugoslav politico-managerial leadership wanted to carry out indispensable restructuring of the economy, time has shown that the largest part of that money was foolishly thrown away, while noncritical technology imports, in fact, increased the disparity between Yugoslavia and the developed world, awakened regional differences, and at the same time brought the country into relations of great dependency on those who were selling somewhat more advanced technology such as, for example, nuclear-related materials or electronics.

Data on Demographic Changes of Ethnic Groups

91BA0469A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 91 pp 34-36

[Article by Dr. Ruza Petrovic: "Based on Certain Assumptions, What Is the Ethnic Structure of the Population of Yugoslavia in 1991?: Numerical Changes in Ethnic Groups"]

[Text] Over the course of time, censuses and their results are becoming an increasingly politicized topic in the sense that questions concerning numbers and natural regeneration according to parts of the country or parts of the population have penetrated the area of political, ethnic, and social analyses and strategies. The 1991 census, which is just about to be conducted, has long been an object of debate, beginning with the question of whether it will be possible to carry it out, and so on.

In all censuses there is particular interest in information concerning the number of members of individual nations, peoples, and nationalities. Although the principles of our internal policy often negate the numbers—for example, the half-million inhabitants of Montenegro are represented in federal institutions to the same extent as the 5 million inhabitants of Serbia without its provinces—they cannot be ignored in real life. This is an essential starting point for the material basis of every community, with numerous consequences and effects on social phenomena and relations.

This is why many people are impatiently anticipating how many of "us" and how many of "them" there will be in 1991. However, we must wait for the results of the census—several months for summary information, and several years for the complete analysis.

The total population of a particular country changes in number over the course of time through natural regeneration and migrations. As a rule, this second factor has a vastly smaller effect in terms of overall population (except under special circumstances, such as in Israel, for example), but is very significant in partial populations, such as republics, districts, and villages, for example. In Yugoslavia, the total growth between 1971 and 1981 came to 1,904,613 persons, and the natural increase was 1,916,606; the difference of minus 11,933 was due to permanent migrations, or rather a positive balance of emigration compared to immigration. Of course, so-called temporary emigration is not included here, and the population of Yugoslavia includes all of its citizens who reside outside its borders.

Aside from natural regeneration and migration, there is another significant factor for ethnic groups (which is understood to mean all individual qualifications—nation, people, nationality, national minority, ethnic group, ethnic orientation—employed by the statistical system): changes in self-designation. The question of the conditions, motives, and causes of these changes, which are very common in our country, is a subject in and of itself, and thus far there has been no societal impetus to

study this question scientifically within the fields of sociology, social psychology, and political science; rather, it can be said that this has been a "taboo subject." These changes in self-designation, which are usually interpreted as inaccuracies and unreliability in the statistical data, in fact represent a societal factor that says a great deal about the society in which it exists. Moreover, the ignored impact of permanent migrations on the growth of the Yugoslav population as a whole could be very significant if permanent migrations are ethnically selective, and could contribute to a decrease or increase in the numbers of some group, as in the case of Italians or Albanians. However, in the largest number of cases, the dominant factor is the natural increase.

Births and deaths are monitored from year to year, which allows us to estimate the natural increase in individual ethnic groups between two censuses, and thus also the future numbers depending solely on that factor. In this way, the ethnic composition of the population of Yugoslavia can be estimated for 1991 if certain conditions, or rather assumptions, are valid.

1. The census will include the population of Yugoslavia in its entirety.

It must be said that the Yugoslav statistical system has been known for its high level of coverage of the population, but before "temporary" economic migrations occurred. Thus, it is known that the 1961 and 1971 censuses recorded fewer inhabitants based on the concept of citizenship, because it did not include part of the people outside the country. This will no doubt be repeated in the next census.

2. The impact of permanent migrations on the figures for individual groups will be negligible in relation to the level of the natural increase, and of equal proportions and relative strength for all groups.

We have already seen that it is not entirely possible to make this assumption either.

3. Not one inhabitant recorded in 1981 and 1991 will change how he declares his nationality.

Changes in these declarations are not uncommon. The growth in the number of Muslims during the 1961-81 period from 0.9 million to 1.7 million, of Turks from 97,000 to 259,000 during 1948-53, of Yugoslavs from 0.2 million to 1.2 million during 1971-81, and the number of Gypsies from 31,000 to 168,000 during 1961-81 are well-known examples of the impact of changes in self-designation. Linking the 1971-81 growth with the natural increase in ethnic groups, it can be seen that there are 537,269 fewer Serbs than the number that there would be solely on the basis of a natural increase; there are 360,865 fewer Croats, 49,000 fewer Muslims, etc., while the number of Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Gypsies increased because of changes in self-designation. Of the change in the number of Yugoslavs, 890,720 are linked to a change in self-designation.

4. Children born from 1981 to 1990 will be of the same nationality in the census as their mother in the year of their birth.

This assumption will be valid for the most part, but not entirely. Children who are born into mixed marriages—and such marriages account for 11 to 13 percent of all marriages entered into in recent years—are rarely identified with the mother, in some cases even more rarely than they are identified as Yugoslavs. Most frequently, however, they are regarded as members of the father's group. The designation of one's offspring is greatly influenced by the total numbers of the groups and by the diffusion of mixed marriages, and these marriages range from 60 to 90 percent among the least numerous groups. The assimilation of offspring from ethnically mixed marriages is practically nonexistent among very small groups, and is most common among the Albanian, Slovene, Macedonian, and Montenegrin groups. In this way, some groups will gain the offspring of mixed marriages, while others will lose them.

5. Deaths from 1981 to 1990 will reflect the same national trends as in the 1981 census.

This assumption as well will not be entirely valid. Yugoslavs are rarely found among death statistics. The average annual number of deceased Yugoslavs from 1981 to 1990 per 1,000 members of that group in 1981 reveals an impossible mortality rate of 1.9; for the entire population, this figure was 9.5. It is obvious that after their death, some Yugoslavs are "returned" to their ancestral group by relatives who decide how the nationality of the deceased is to be recorded, which has an indirect effect on their numbers.

6. The number of births and deaths according to nationality in the first quarter of 1981 will be the same as the number of births in the first quarter of 1991.

Specifically, data on births and deaths are provided for calendar years, while the census goes to 31 March, so that a certain period of time is neglected. In the majority of groups with a decline in natural growth, this will be a little higher at the beginning of 1981 than in 1991, while in those that experience a growth in the number of births (Albanians, Gypsies), it will be a little lower.

7. The classifications for analyzing the data will not be changed.

But they will be changed if the new entries for Bunjevaks (who in the past have been included in statistics as Croats), Egyptians, and "Jedjups" (who in the past have designated themselves primarily as Albanians) are introduced...

8. There will be no systematic societal intervention, either official or unofficial, affecting the declarations of individuals.

Systematic societal intervention was seen in 1948, for example, when it was insisted that muslims (uncapitalized, as a religious designation) declare their ethnicity, so

that parts of them were registered as Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. Or, after the introduction of the "regionally oriented" entry in 1971, this was not applied in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While official societal intervention is recognizable, unofficial—but often very effective—intervention evades detection. Still, it cannot be concealed from experts completely, and it is known to have occurred in some parts of the country.

If all of these assumptions were valid—and not one of them will be entirely valid, but rather will be so to a greater or lesser degree—then the number of members of each ethnic group would be defined solely by its natural increase.

The natural increase of the ethnic groups is known for 1981 to 1989, but for 1990 the data on births and deaths have not yet been formulated according to nationality; all that is known is their total number. We can get an estimate for 1990 by applying the ethnic structure of births and deaths from the previous year to the total number.

Taking all of this into account, let us take a look at what the ethnic structure of the population of Yugoslavia would look like in 1991 under these conditions.

The natural increase from 1981 to 1990 was 1.4 million, which is the difference between 3.5 million births and 2.1 million deaths; relative to the 1981 population figure, this yields an average annual rate of only 6.4 per thousand. In the previous recorded decade, the natural increase came to 1.9 million, which yielded an annual rate of 9.3 per thousand, relative to the 1971 population figure. The decline in the natural increase in our country is very sharp, resulting from a systematic decline in the number of births and a slight rise in the number of deaths due to the intensive aging of the population and the ever-smaller number of children in the family.

Among ethnic groups, we have four types of natural regeneration: extremely high and high, above-average, very low, and negative. The Albanian and Gypsy groups are extremely high, with the highest birth rate in Europe but an average mortality rate, which yields a rate of increase of 25 to 24 per thousand, six times higher than the Yugoslav rate; this rate will bring a doubling of the population in around three decades. The Turkish and Muslim groups have a high natural increase, more than two times that of the Yugoslav average. The Yugoslav, Macedonian, and Montenegrin groups have an above-average natural increase, and among these groups the Yugoslav group has the lowest birth rate, even below the Yugoslav level, but also an impossibly low rate of mortality. Moreover, all of these groups have a younger, more advantageous age structure.

The two most numerous groups in the population, the Serbs and the Croats, had a very low natural increase from 1981 to 1990, with a rate of only 2.2 per million, due to the low birth rate and the high mortality rate. They are joined by the Slovenes, among whom the birth

rate is the same as among the Serbs, while the rate of mortality is higher due to the higher average age.

It is possible to say that groups with very low rates of natural increase over the last decade will probably experience a negative natural regeneration, with more deaths. Specifically, to this day there is no known case where a very low natural increase is maintained at the same level over a long period of time; it slowly turns to the negative. This decline is also found in the decade in question: The average annual increase of Slovenes is 2,879, but in 1989 it was only 1,217; among Serbs, these figures are 18,242 and 7,102. In order to stay at the same level, it would be necessary to undertake extraordinary societal action and many measures, significant changes in the social distribution and in the social climate.

All other groups under study had more deaths than births, and thus a negative natural increase. The majority of them began to lose people even during 1971-81 through the natural increase. This decline is most moderate, relatively speaking, among the Vlach, Ruthenian, and Slovene groups, but is very strong among the Hungarians, the Czechs, and especially the Italians.

Thus, it is obvious that the numbers of the country's ethnic groups will change in different directions and intensities. On the one hand are groups that will decrease in number, and on the other hand those with high and exceptionally high growth. The share of the first groups among the Yugoslav population will decrease, while the share of the second groups will increase. In this way, the Albanian group, with almost the same number as the Slovene group in 1981, will see a pronounced increase, surpassing the Slovenes and approaching the figure for the Muslim group. Among them we will have first of all groups whose growth has allowed an unchanged ratio to the total population, the Macedonians and Montenegrins, and then groups among which the number of people will be somewhat higher but whose share in the total population is smaller—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Since not one of the initial assumptions will be entirely valid, the difference between this assessment of the 1991 figures and the actual figures that the census will show will in fact signify the cumulative impact of aberrations from all assumptions.

The greatest interest will no doubt be aroused by the aberration from the assumption that persons recorded in 1981 and 1991 will not change their declarations concerning their nationality. In terms of a change in the ethnopolitical situation during this decade, the most interesting question will no doubt be to what extent there will be an aberration among Yugoslavs, and in what direction.

Will Yugoslavs increase in number in 1991 through changes in the self-designation of people of various ethnic origins, or will they decrease through people returning to their ancestral group? Judging from the situation at the present moment, the latter seems more

likely, especially in some republics where ethnic polarization is most acute. But surprises are not impossible. The Yugoslav self-designation will in any event be rejected most infrequently by the offspring of mixed

marriages, since they are precisely that, both socially and biologically. And in 1981 there were nearly a half a million families in Yugoslavia in which the husband and wife were of different nationalities.

BULGARIA

Former Military Nomenklatura Accused of Intrigues*AU0905180191 Sofia FAKS in Bulgarian 4 May 91
pp 1-2*

[Article by Mariyan Khinov: "Former Military Leaders Are Still Longing for Power"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday a group of military personnel and members of their families waited outside the Ministry of Defense building to be received by the minister. They wanted to inform him about breaches of law in connection with the distribution of housing units by the military housing fund. Colonel General Mutafov was, however, busy, and Deputy Minister Colonel General Stoyan Buchvarov is on leave. This is happening right at the time when housing is being distributed and shortly after some officers alerted the ministry that gasoline expenditures for military officials' automobiles have increased during the most severe fuel crisis.

Army General of the Reserves Dobri Dzhurov has no intention whatsoever of returning his official car VAZ 2107 [Soviet-made type of automobile for military officials], with the Sofia 2994 registration number, to the Ministry of Defense pool. The order authorizing him to use the car was allegedly expected to expire on 1 March 1991. Every morning at 0600 local time [0300 GMT], he is driven to the Army stadium, where he enjoys his physical training. The ex-minister is also still attended by an aide, and, according to well informed sources, he regularly meets Colonel General Radnyu Minchev, chief of the Bulgarian Army's General Staff, and other high-ranking officers, who presumably brief him on topical events.

The man who designated General Buchvarov as his successor is Colonel of the Reserves Boris Todorov. He was deputy minister of defense in charge of armaments and technical equipment for over 20 years. He was well known under the nickname King Todor and as Dzhurov's right hand. As an official in charge of arms exports and imports and of our military industry, he was responsible for the purchase of 100 T-34 tanks (models from World War II) in the 1964-66 period. [passage omitted] His numerous wrong decisions in connection with the purchase of weapons represent seven-figure losses for our economy.

FAKS has a 20-page manuscript recently written by General Todorov to the present minister of defense at its disposal. In this letter, he refers in the following terms to the "Rakovski" Legion, the social and professional organization of the Bulgarian officers, registered at the Khaskovo Okrug Court: The legion shows tendencies of developing and acting like the Podkrepa Labor Confederation.... After involving the majority of the officers' staff, the legion may become more aggressive and organize some mass events, such as rallies and demonstrations.... The case of the "no-confidence" vote for the

minister of defense is significant in this connection.... The law courts are not entitled to authorize the establishment of any organizations and structures within the Bulgarian People's Army. The letter is dated 4 February 1991 and prompted a resolution, which Minister Mutafov issued on 6 February and which reads as follows: "To General Minchev, General Iliev, and members of the ministry's collegium: For their information, requesting them to present their views and highlight the problems raised by General Todorov..."

After the leadership of the officers' legion mentioned the document in question at its 20 March 1991 news conference, General Todorov gathered his former subordinates at the Defense Ministry [MO]—2 building for instructions warning them that officers and persons who do not belong to the inner circle should have no access to the affairs of former military leaders.

Officers Legion Voices Support for President*AU0905114091 Sofia BTA in English 0819 GMT
9 May 91*

[Text] Sofia, May 9 (BTA)—The "TRUD" daily reports that a representative of the Rakovski Officers' Legion told the press yesterday that in the event of a military coup the legion will support the president. The Bulgarian president told a Spanish newspaper a few days ago that he does not rule out the possibility of a military intervention under certain circumstances.

The Bulgarian Officers' Legion was founded a year ago. Now its members number some 12,000.

A leader of the legion said yesterday that the organization does not need the support of the political forces but will not reject their cooperation. He added that the legion supports the republican ideals and does not wish to be called "royal."

HUNGARY

Defense Ministry Official Explains Resignation*AU0805190091 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 4 May 91 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Mihaly Beothy, deputy state secretary at the Hungarian Defense Ministry, by Peter Forro; place and date not given: "Beothy's Request To Resign Has Been Accepted"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Mihaly Beothy tendered his resignation with Defense Minister Lajos Fur in the middle of April 1991. He did not wish to make a statement about the reasons for his request at the time, because Lajos Fur was in Japan with a Hungarian Democratic Forum delegation. Since then, Mihaly Beothy has had consultations with the minister, and there was nothing to prevent him from giving an interview to the correspondents of MAGYAR HIRLAP and NEPSZABADSAG.

[Forro] Let us start with the most important thing, namely whether the minister has accepted your resignation?

[Beothy] Yes, he has. We agreed that I would remain in my office for a few weeks and perform my duties until my successor is installed in office.

[Forro] When did you decide to resign?

[Beothy] As a matter of fact, it became obvious to me after a very important meeting on 15 April that I could not perform my duties because of the circumstances that had arisen.

[Forro] I understand from what you are saying that professional reasons led you to take this step, not personal conflicts. What were your reasons?

[Beothy] Our government decided last summer that Hungary needed a defense structure and a new doctrine worthy of our country's status. The drafting began; I dealt with the political issues of the defense concept. I worked on a concept that would safeguard Hungary's interests, that would be independent of parties and of the government of the day, and that would only take Hungary's security into consideration. Nobody challenged the ideas and conclusions of this 20-page report. The leaders of parties also received a copy, so I decided that the report could serve as a stepping stone, even if it was not perfect. However, we learned that in December 1990 that the Army's restructuring had become an urgent task because of our ministry's shortfall of finances (the Defense Ministry's budget is 54 billion forints, and the Army has to ensure that it is supplemented—MAGYAR HIRLAP editor's note). Well, it became a secondary issue to draw up the basic principles in this situation, and our obligations to deal with the crises came to the forefront. That is to say, it came to light during the discussions that the structure will sooner or later consume the basic principles, whether we like it or not. The same military leadership participated in the preparation of both documents, therefore, the temptation only to adjust the requirements was far too strong. In other words, the decision makers confused urgency with importance in my view.

[Forro] Were you left on your own in these discussions to such an extent that you had no hope left of winning this professional battle?

[Beothy] My point of view was only accepted by the minority at important meetings, and I stress, these were not exclusive discussions. The majority of the military headquarters' staff, including its highest ranking leaders, voted against me. All of this put our minister, Lajos Fur, into a difficult position because, being a civilian politician, he could not confront the military headquarters on military issues. Eventually, the decision was made at the aforementioned meeting on 15 April for our ministry to present to the government the Hungarian Republic's defense principles and the new army structure, to which I am opposed in this form.

[Forro] In which points does your opinion actually differ?

[Beothy] The new structure preserves the Army's old and nondefensive characteristics, although with fewer staff. It does not say anything that is new, so we continue to be burdened by the Warsaw Pact's legacy. That is, our Army is set up and trained for forward movement instead of being prepared for independent defense, and the officers are also better at offensive military strategy than defensive warfare. We do not have an independent air defense, the mobility of the troops is inadequate, and in many respects the document is based on a traditional system of mobilization, so in summary, the idea is full of compromises.

[Forro] Could the fact that you are a civilian have played a role in the rejection of your concept?

[Beothy] I will not talk about a military versus civilian conflict within the Defense Ministry. I would rather say that since the formation of the new government the smallest changes have been in the top rank military leadership, so it would be foolish to expect their attitude to have changed, because it cannot humanly be expected from the members of the leadership. In other words, the Defense Ministry still works too militaristically, although there is a need for a more colorful and "softer" style in some areas, for example, in the general administration.

[Forro] Do you have any ideas about your future workplace?

[Beothy] Regarding my workplace I am on a kind of patrol, so the few weeks of transition are also useful for me. I might even end up in journalism.

YUGOSLAVIA

Formation of Croatian Army Planned

91BA0478B Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 22 Mar 91 p 15

[Article by Tihomir Dujmovic: "White Hand: How the Croatian Army Is Emerging"]

[Text] Croatia's dreams of an independent state also include the dream of its own army. All the tricks with the joint Army from the emergence of Yugoslavia onward have been perceived by Croats as an ordinary deception, since it always involved Serbian units accompanied by the demagoguery of Yugoslavism. The process of the Serbization of the Yugoslav Army began immediately after the unification in 1918.

Immediately after the unification, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia proclaimed the equality of the officer corps from the Kingdom of Serbia, the Kingdom of Montenegro, and the recently established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. About 3,500 active Serbian officers, about

2,500 Austro-Hungarian ones, and about 500 Montenegrin ones were accepted into the joint Army. And since Serbia is a master at Balkanizing any agreement, criticisms soon began of the non-Serbian officers and even Serbian officers from districts on the other side of the Sava and the Danube (not from central Serbia): They were allegedly "poorly educated," even though those officers, as a rule, were better educated than the Serbian ones; and soon they were also reproached for laziness and living in excessive comfort. This was the basis for a purge in subsequent years, when the non-Serbian corps was completely marginalized and often even demobilized. All of the key posts were occupied by officers from the Kingdom of Serbia, and all the symbols, language, writing system, and training also contributed to this; and personnel issues were under the direct jurisdiction of the secret officers' organization White Hand, which was completely subordinate to King Aleksandar.

Croatia had its next unpleasant experience with the joint Yugoslav Army in J.B. Tito's state. Although the Serbian officer corps was very modest from 1942 to 1944, because until that year Serbs were not too interested in the partisans (among other things, except for the battle for the Uzica republic, there were no significant battles or units on Serbian territory), the Army was Serbized toward the end of the war.

Croats have not forgotten that the supreme command ordered the commander of the 10th Zagreb corps, Ivan Sibel, to remain in Zelina with his units and not to enter Zagreb by any means. The order was issued on 6 May 1945, and on the same day Koca Popovic received an order to make a forced march with the Second Army from Slavonia toward Zagreb. Zagreb was consequently not liberated by units composed primarily of Croats, but instead by the Second Army, which included mostly young Serbs who had been mobilized just a little while before and a considerable number of Cetniks who had refused to obey Draza Mihailovic.

Today, about 80 percent of the JLA's [Yugoslav People's Army] officers are of Serbian nationality. Absolutely all the Army's actions upon the appearance of any sensitive situation whatsoever, from Kosovo to Pakrac, have also been Serbian in content. The recent arms imports were only the first beginning of the emergence of Croatian armed forces. The increasingly more excitable responses by Serbia and the JLA, which, according to the internal logic of Byzantines, only recognize force in their value system, have also contributed to turning the issue of establishing Croatia's own army into an imperative. Although it was in fact one of the Croatian government's resolutions that provided for the establishment of police detachments "to protect the republic bodies in the event of war," another provision calls for the possibility of forming active and reserve forces with 75,000 police officers. The police are, in spite of everything, only an internal defensive shield, and not an external one. Aside from the romantic dreams about a Croatian army, celebrated in the slogan about a Croatian gun on a Croatian

shoulder, the reasons for establishing an army in that republic are much more pragmatic in nature.

According to some analyses, which have been most thoroughly performed by military analyst Fran Visnar, during the period from 1991 to 1992 the Croatian army would already have 20,000 people in ground units, of whom 14,000 would be conscripts, and the rest would be officers and noncommissioned officers. The military air force would have 9,100 troops, and the navy 5,900. From the statistical point of view, there are approximately 210,000 young Croatian men between the ages of 18 and 22, and as many as 360,000 between the ages of 23 and 32, which means that around 570,000 people are capable of military service. According to Visnar's research, the term of military service for the infantry and the ground forces could be reduced from the present 12 months to eight months of uninterrupted training, but that would not apply to the navy and the air force. Furthermore, the ground forces should be reinforced, Visnar claims, with 120 medium tanks, 80 light ones, and 250 armed and armored vehicles, and at least that many personnel carriers. It would be necessary to add 550 heavy cannons and howitzers, 1,200 mortars, and several hundred of the most modern mobile antitank launchers with rapid-firing antiair missiles. The military air force should be equipped with 116 aircraft and 42 helicopters, and the Croatian navy should have two frigates, 38 light combat boats, 10 minelayers, etc. In Visnar's opinion, domestic shipbuilders could build from five to seven submarines even during the first decade of the existence of the Croatian army.

If Croatia itself could provide a billion dollars, which seems quite likely, and if it could collect another billion through contributions from emigrants and favorable loans, that would be enough for a start, for the expenses of the first year. This has to do with the first phase, when 30,000 to 40,000 people would be included in the military units, but the money would also be used to maintain police units, which would be organized in accordance with world standards, and would consist of 6,000 to 8,000 men. If they wanted to have a real army, that would only be possible in a somewhat more distant period, and \$7 to \$8 billion would have to be spent on it. If Croatia does not take advantage of the historic opportunity to form its own state and thus also its own army, our generation will certainly not see another such opportunity if the USSR were to be consolidated, and Serbia, because of its idyllic Orthodox ties to Russia, again found confidence on the part of a valuable defender of its policy. On one hand, the West's historic responsibility for such a situation would certainly squash our illusions about its role as a savior, but on the other hand, that responsibility would be a completely barren compensation for the traumatic period that Croatia could undergo as well. The same consequences would come from Milosevic's resignation, after which the Serbs would probably no longer allow themselves to be ruled by any sort of communist again to whom the West would not be favorably inclined. If it happened that the communist

regime in Serbia fell, the West would be more inclined to preserve Yugoslavia. And then only we will know that essentially nothing has really changed. With our own army, the story would be somewhat different.

Slovene Plans for National Security

91BA0478A Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 26 Mar 91
pp 10-14

[Article by Miran Lesjak: "Slovene Army"]

[Text] At the recently established Center for Strategic Studies, the "Plans for the National Security of the Republic for Slovenia," which has been so often demanded, has appeared. This extensive document, which is still a working draft, and which is marked "Official Secret—Strictly Confidential," has the ambition of laying the foundations for the universal security for Slovene society and individuals. It appears that in this phase of planning national security, the practical consequences of the new strategy could be the armed neutrality of the state, an army limited in size, a reorganized civil defense, and a reorganized defense industry complex. All of these are reasons for peace activists to rage....

First of all, as a preface, here are some controversial figures for consideration. According to December 1990 data from the poll on national security in Slovenia, 51.2 percent of Slovene citizens think that Slovenia's security is seriously threatened by the environment, 58.3 percent of the citizens polled are convinced that a weak economy is the greatest danger to Slovenia, and 41 percent of the people see a great danger threatening the republic in scientific and technical backwardness. In comparison with these figures, citizens' fears of a military conflict are a small portion: 35.2 percent of them see a very great threat to Slovene security in the possibility of an outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia, and 24.5 percent view the possibility of JLA [Yugoslav People's Army] intervention in Slovenia as the blackest factor threatening Slovene security. Only 1.9 percent of those polled attribute the biggest role in preserving the Slovene Republic's sovereignty and independence to a Slovene army. At most, 38.8 percent of the people would vote in a referendum for establishing a Slovene army; this is also a fact that the Defense Ministry likes to cite when it has to prove that the public wants such an army. Nevertheless, 38.3 percent of those polled (which is also the highest among the answers to this question) support the demilitarization of Slovenia, with 56.1 percent of the people understanding this term to mean the general and complete elimination of the army and weapons. Again, 39.3 percent of the people think that Slovenia would most effectively ensure its military security with its own army.

The data cited show by themselves that without collating the answers to different questions, it is very difficult to determine what Slovene citizens even think about their own security and defense policy, and to what extent their

views on those issues are really consistent. The "Plans for the National Security of the Republic of Slovenia" is an extensive document that is marked "Official Secret—Strictly Confidential." According to the above-mentioned poll, 51.4 percent of the respondents think that concealing information on military strength is senseless, because it can be quickly discovered with the aid of modern technology. The "Plans" do not even contain any particularly exclusive military information, but they are interesting—and that is probably also why they are secret—because they reveal the logic of the thinking of Slovenia military and paramilitary structures and institutions. Since part of the "Plans" was published by the magazine OBRAMBA, and after the Republic Secretary for National Defense himself spoke about their contents in an interview for DOLENJSKI LIST, there is no official secrecy any longer.

Broad Concept of Security

The authors of the "Plans for the National Security of the Republic of Slovenia" are of the opinion that it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of "national defense" and "national security." The first concept refers to ensuring military security by means of the armed forces, while some people also include civil defense as well; the second concept refers to physical and psychological security, which can be threatened either from within or outside of a social system, or both at the same time. "In that sense," they say, "national security is a broader concept, which also includes national defense." Dr. Anton Grizold, from the Defense Studies Department at the FSPN [Faculty for Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism], who is participating in the preparation of the "Plans for National Security," views security as an integral category: "The concept of modern security should be redefined in such a way that in formulating and developing activities intended to ensure security, all of its aspects are taken into account: economic, social, ecological, intellectual, and spiritual aspects. It is also necessary to take into account the intensive process of the universalization of security. That means that security is becoming a universal process and a universal problem: Neglecting one of the aspects of security can even lead to catastrophe."

In order to avoid this, the state is preparing a whole list of values that should be protected. The Slovene national security system should thus protect the universal values of mankind (world peace, human rights and freedoms, and the safety of the natural and social environment), values of general social interest (independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the constitutional basis for the state system, and the stability of the international order in this part of the world), and values of particular importance for the functioning of the Slovene state order (the rule of law, multiparty parliamentary democracy, economic and technological development, the safety of all forms of property, a market economy, etc.). Dr. Grizold does not even consider it worthwhile to discuss the issue of whether we need a national security concept or not: "But we should discuss what elements the

national security system should contain, and what the relationship among them should be." "Only after that," Dr. Grizold explains, "will it be time to discuss whether the military aspect of Slovenia's national security can be ensured in the near future without armed forces." "If that is possible, then it is also necessary to answer the question of what the mechanism to allow it will be, because the state simply cannot afford not to ensure the military aspect of national security. I say that it is necessary to ensure it, but it should not, however, be extended to all of national security. The military aspect is one of the elements of security as a whole. If we leave it out, it is the same thing as leaving the ecological or some other aspect out of the concept of security. In saying this, I am not claiming that Slovenia has to have its own armed forces. It is possible to enlarge the police force, but in that case we will have a police state—and thanks very much for that kind of state. It is possible to ask someone else to ensure the state's military security, but at the moment that a state arises, its first duty is to ensure national security."

Neutrality Yes, Pacts No

The proposals on how to set up Slovene national security are also derived from analyses and predictions of the future geopolitical and military-political position of the Slovene state. According to those analyses, Slovene security should be influenced by the fact that the bipolar division of the international community no longer exists, and that there is only one superpower in international relations, the United States of America, which will delegate certain roles in Europe to its allies. For Slovenia, an important conclusion from such predictions is that there will be a reduction in the American military presence in the immediate vicinity of our borders, and that Germany and Italy will represent its interests in that area. The position of Hungary, which wants to follow Austria's example by replacing its former bloc membership with armed neutrality, would also be decisive for consideration of which components of national security should be more developed and which less so. Since the danger of a bloc conflict has almost disappeared, there should also be a reduction in the concentration of JLA units on Slovene territory, where that concentration has in fact been the highest until now. Probably a decisive conclusion for planning Slovene security policy is that, regardless of the relaxation of tensions outside Yugoslavia's borders and the tensions and threats present within Yugoslavia, the conditions have not yet been ensured for the safe existence of a disarmed Slovene republic, and so it should build defense ties with other Yugoslav republics.

Within the framework of such premises, Dr. Anton Bebler, one of the planners of Slovene national security, advocates establishing a policy of permanent armed neutrality, but rejects the possibility of Slovenia's joining NATO as an unrealistic option. In its new constitution, Slovenia should declare a permanent neutral peacetime policy, which would be an active policy of nonalignment,

without membership in the nonaligned movement. Slovenia, as a neutral state or a member of a neutral alliance of Yugoslav republics, should not use force against another state or participate in a war between other states, except in self-defense. It would have to avoid any steps that could involve it in a military conflict, and would also have to renounce providing direct or indirect support to any of the belligerents. In that case, the level of armament of the Slovene armed forces could and should be lower than that of the Yugoslav armed forces today. "Such a Slovene posture," Dr. Bebler concludes in "Memoranda on Neutrality," "would mean partial disarmament, and in that sense, demilitarization."

Prevailing Fear of Yugoslavia

Even though the concepts concerning the functioning of the Slovene national security system take into account all sources and types of threats to that security (from ecological and biological to economic, social, etc.), one cannot avoid the feeling that national security, which is supposed to be universal, is being planned primarily under the impression of the current security and political situation in Yugoslavia, and that consequently the security concept is being developed on the basis of awareness of the existence of the Yugoslav crisis. It is interesting that such comments are also appearing in the Council for National Defense, which is currently discussing the "Plans for the National Security of the Republic of Slovenia," and that they are being uttered even by those members of the Council whose positions are frequently determined by their military profession. After two discussions of the "Plans for Slovene National Security," warnings could already be heard in the Council for National Defense that the preparations for the "Plans" should not be hurried and that the "Plans" were appearing in a transitional period. During the transitional period, the temporary law on national defense should thus suffice, but the competent republic secretary has commented on such ideas rather cynically with the statement that every law, of course, is temporary.

The warnings that preparation of the concept for the operation of a universal security system should not be influenced by the daily political situation are based on two positions, which are not unambiguous. The first one cites the fact that in order to designate the sources and types of threats to the Republic of Slovenia, it is important to know how present those sources are today, and what the likelihood is that they will become active in the near future. The second such position maintains that in view of the pressures in recent years, "currently the most serious danger to the Slovene state is a threat from the East, i.e., from the territory of Yugoslavia." Slovene strategists, who emphatically respect the "Yugo-factor" in planning national security, predict that a possible attacker could threaten Slovene security either with a military coup at the time when Slovenia is becoming independent, or with a military intervention after independence. In both cases there would be a conflict by traditional means, in which, in comparison with the Western danger, more poorly equipped armed forces

would be involved, with technologically highly developed equipment and weapons, with a higher percentage of infantry, which would be supported by a weaker air force. Nevertheless, in such a conflict the opposing armed forces would deserve full respect as well, they say.

That is why the calculations are on the table. Military analysts cite the fact that Slovenia could commit up to 10 percent of its population for directly opposing aggression from any state whatsoever, but an inhabitant involved in the military would require from seven to 10 inhabitants in the rear to support him.

Total Concept

The Slovene republic's security system is to be based on the Slovene military and defense tradition, and on the values of modern Slovene society. The Slovene military and defense tradition began with the organized resistance to Turkish raids and ended with some of the modern experiences in the joint armed forces of Yugoslavia. Here is the end of the elements of Slovene defensive awareness, and the end of liberty. Marko Hren, from the Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, is horrified by such an initial approach to building the national security system, and thinks that the planned system is "catastrophic, in view of the fact that half of Slovene politics cites a peaceful policy." Hren wonders what it means for the emergence of the national security system if, in enumerating Slovene defense traditions, no one remembered the kind of experience in nonviolent resistance that Slovenes gained through the work of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights.

Hren's comment alludes to the fact that the authors of the national security system are not capable of seeing anything but firearms, and that in the studies that they are preparing they are forgetting about the proclaimed universal security of the modern Slovene, and viewing it exclusively in terms of the armed defense of the state against aggression. How comical such a narrow understanding of national security is, is proven by the assertion that the sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia will be asserted primarily through the role of the defense system in the defense of the Slovene republic, through the use of the Slovene language in the armed forces, through the expression of independence and sovereignty by means of our own symbols, the external appearance of members of the security system, etc. Very little space is devoted to economic, ecological, and other types of security in the "Plans for the National Security of the Republic of Slovenia," and because of this it is not clear why the studies, in accordance with the previously mentioned distinction, do not bear the title of "Plans for Slovene National Defense."

Because of this, Marko Hren is convinced that the Slovene national security concept that is emerging is just as total a concept as SLO [Nationwide Defense] and DSZ [Social Self-Defense]. Hren does not see any difference between the national security system and the SLO and DSZ system, and asserts that it is still "a Bolshevik

concept of the militarization of society, minus the recognized right to conscientious objection."

"The 'Plans for Slovene National Security' do not allow for an active approach to peace policy, and do not include mechanisms for the preliminary settlement of conflicts, or include confidence-building measures, the two basic techniques of security policy. Instead, they proceed a priori from the position that the unarmed defense of Slovenia is not possible, they equate nonviolent resistance, to the extent that they mention it at all, with unarmed resistance, which can even be very violent. It is a study of a passive security and defense concept, and it is a military study that talks about the military defense of the state, and does not implement anything in connection with peace policy. Its authors are thinking about military conflict, and not about settling conflicts, and that is why it is understandable that they do not see any conditions for demilitarization."

Slovene Armed Forces

At least as far as the national defense component of Slovene national security is concerned, one cannot see any essential difference from the SLO and DSZ concept in its fundamental philosophy for the use and development of the armed forces. The Slovene armed forces are to be organized, trained, and led in such a way that they would take preventive action and thus repel an armed attack, and on the other hand they would defend the state during an attack. In accordance with Slovene neutrality, the armed forces would not be used for threats of aggression or for aggression against third states. The national defense doctrine that would be activated at the time of an aggression relies upon the well-known plan for a "long-term defensive war of liberation." There would be an attempt to prevent a blitzkrieg; the less numerous Slovene armed forces would attack carefully selected targets, which would be of vital importance to the enemy. That doctrine also takes into account the effect on the balance of forces on the battlefield, which would be determined by the Republic of Slovenia's relations with individual neighboring states. Consequently, it seems that it could happen that part of those relations could consist of mutual defense obligations with certain (?) neighboring states, which would have to be signed at the well-known meetings in Slovene castles.

The projected outline for permanent armed Slovene neutrality includes calculations of the structure of the armed forces, the demographic potential of which is determined by the more than 400,000 registered military conscripts in Slovenia. The permanent composition of the combined professional and conscript army, of course, could be considerably smaller, and closer in numbers to Janez Jansa's February 1990 estimate. One can thus hear the figure of 56,000 military conscripts, i.e., a permanent 3 percent of the Slovene population under arms. Geographic and geostrategic analyses of

Slovenia indicate that the armed forces could be composed of a certain number of brigades with a maneuvering structure, infantry detachments, reconnaissance battalions, and multipurpose helicopter and coast guard units. All of these units, in the event of aggression, would have to resist approximately 200,000 armed soldiers, the number that an attacker would need for total control of Slovene territory.

The Slovene armed forces would have continuity primarily from territorial defense, and their structure would only include one branch of service—the ground forces. The planners of the armed forces are renouncing a navy, because in peacetime the control and defense of the sea and the coast will be carried out by internal affairs authorities or coast guard units. The possibility of the appearance of coast guard units has already been mentioned by the republic secretary for internal affairs in his answer to a deputy's proposal for the adoption of the "Declaration on the Maritime Orientation of Slovenia." There would also not be an air force as a separate branch of the armed forces, but a fairly small number of helicopters and aircraft could be attached to the ground forces as a support element. The reason for renouncing an air force as an independent branch of the armed forces is simple: It has been determined that a comprehensive system for air control and antiair defense is too demanding an undertaking for Slovenia in the short term. Even in training pilots, the technical structure, and performing repairs on those few aircraft, Slovenia would have to rely on foreign suppliers of military equipment.

It has been planned that Slovenia's armed forces would be lead and commanded by a general staff and military-territorial and regional-territorial commands. The fact that such a command structure is in fact being prepared was also indirectly made known at the last meeting of the Assembly commission on defense by Minister Janez Jansa, who spoke about the role of opstina secretariats for national defense under the new defense law. Jansa announced that after the new constitution was adopted, his secretariat would also propose "a new means of organization in that area."

The command corps of the armed forces is to be primarily a professional one, but Slovenia will not have a classic military school system, as Minister of Education Peter Vencelj has already stated at one of the recent government press conferences. Military education would thus include the training of military conscripts in the armed forces, and modified programs at the Defense Studies Department at the FSPN; the establishment of an independent nonmilitary scientific research institution for the area of defense and protection has been planned for some later date. In this regard, it is planned that military conscripts will be trained for seven months in study centers, and this, of course, will be according to the principle of three months of general "instruction" and four months of training in combat units, when conscripts could also be "used in combat."

Defense Ministry in Reconnaissance

The preparations for the national security plans, which devote considerable space to a detailed discussion of the Slovene armed forces, are, as we have already stated, still at the stage of discussions in the republic presidency's Council for National Defense. From what has already been written, it is evident that the creators of the national security system are acting in coordination with the proposers of the law on defense and protection, which is at the proposal stage and which has yet to be adopted by the Republic Assembly. When the "Plans for National Security" have gone far enough for that document to reach the parliament as well, it can be expected that certain political parties and peace activists who have a different view of demilitarization will oppose it bitterly. It is therefore surprising what a strong green light was given to the proposed law on defense and protection by the Assembly's defense commission, which also includes opposition representatives. Along with the other members of the commission, these people assessed Jansa's draft law as a good one, but with that law "of transitional significance" the republic secretary for national defense was actually only testing the parliament's mood before dealing with the document on the Slovene national security system. The situation is actually such that after the law has been passed with the consent of the opposition, it will be very difficult for the latter to reject certain national security components, since it will have already confirmed them in the law on defense and protection. The fact that before the "Plans for National Security" are adopted a new constitution probably still has to be adopted, which could also contain the so-called peace article, does not change much, all things considered.

It is interesting that the draft of the law under discussion said that the military obligation would be performed in territorial defense units, but the proposal for the law says that it will be performed in "undefined" armed forces. In response to a question about what that change meant, Janez Jansa craftily answered that the proposer of the law was acting in accordance with the valid federal and republic constitutions. The federal constitution, as we know, understands "armed forces" to mean both JLA units and territorial defense units, which together do not constitute undefined armed forces, but rather the armed forces of the SFRY. The proposed defense law, however, does not mention the SFRY's armed forces. With a constitutional law on conscription that ignores the JLA, such false ignorance on the part of the minister who pretends to respect the federal constitution and whose Center for Strategic Studies is planning Slovene armed forces is naturally very amusing.

The proposed law on defense and protection is thus written in such a way that it can be interpreted as one pleases and in accordance with what the daily political needs are. According to it, armed forces and the JLA exist in Slovenia, and there are "civilian and military personnel" in the permanent staff of territorial defense. The proposed law, in the chapter on "Territorial

Defense," in the subchapter on "Service in Territorial Defense," also says what military personnel are: "Military personnel, according to this law, are military personnel on active service, members of the reserve force, as long as they are on military duty in territorial defense, and soldiers who are performing military service in territorial defense." Consequently, if we are reading the proposed law correctly, the proposer of the law does not consider JLA Colonel Milan Aksentijevic to be military personnel.

"Military personnel on active duty and civilian personnel in the permanent employ of territorial defense cannot be members of any political organization." Why not? Because the "Plans for National Security" say that members of the professional staff of the armed forces should not have the right of political organization. Both the proposed defense law and the "Plans," in addition to the removal of parties from the armed forces (political parties cannot operate in the armed forces), are also introducing depoliticization of the officer corps. Peace activists, who see the denial of officers' rights to be members of political parties as a violation of general human rights, have already protested against this.

Janez Jansa explained the decision on depoliticizing the officer corps to the defense commission by citing the same practice in several other countries, but in effect interpreted the decision in terms of the existence of the LC [League of Communists]-Movement for Yugoslavia as an army party, which unites former members of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] in the JLA. In Jansa's opinion, this decision should only be in effect during the transitional period, and later on, the republic secretary allows for the possibility of a transition to the so-called German system, according to which the officer corps is allowed membership in political parties, and noncommissioned officers can also be candidates for state offices, but other officers cannot.

Everything indicates that the decision on depoliticizing the professional staff of territorial defense and the future armed forces still has a considerably more pragmatic motive than the republic secretary was prepared to admit in the discussion of the defense law. The planners of independent Slovenia's army obviously expect that in the beginning the Slovene armed forces will face a reduction in the officer corps, as a result of which they will probably also have to employ officers who would be prepared to replace service in one army (the JLA) with service in another. In doing so, in order to prevent the infiltration of hostile elements, as that is sometimes neatly called, they have to use the law to prevent the LC-Movement for Yugoslavia from exerting influence upon the Slovene army. Such an interest is completely legitimate, but if human rights are being violated or restricted, there would not be anything wrong if, instead of a general ban on membership in political parties, they banned officers from membership in the LC-Movement for Yugoslavia. Democratic Slovenia would thus obtain

at least one banned political party, and the LC-Movement for Yugoslavia would obtain the greater publicity that it deserves.

All Beautiful Transitional Words

Nevertheless, before part of the present JLA officer corps is reemployed, it will be necessary to adopt the new Slovene constitution, since the Defense Ministry will not be able to "smuggle" the Slovene armed forces through the law on defense and protection much longer. A significant part of the Slovene political parties are demanding that the new constitution should include a peace article, which would define the Slovene republic as a demilitarized state. In the meantime, the authors of the "Plans" are not opposing demilitarization as a process, but think that demilitarization as a state is still a utopian idea that is temporary in nature. In their opinion, the advocates of the idea of the demilitarization of Slovenia, who are talking about a so-called transitional period that would supposedly prove that it is not realistic to expect the complete disarmament of Slovenia in the near future, should also be aware of that.

In addition to a transitional period during the processes of the demilitarization of Slovenia and demilitarized Slovenia, a transitional system is also expected, in which Slovenia's security would also be ensured by JLA units. During that period, the federation, in exchange for Slovenia's financing the JLA, would have to vacate a third of the military installations in Slovenia by 1 August 1991; on 1 January 1992, it would have to begin removing the remaining JLA units from Slovene territory, without a simultaneous transfer of weapons and military equipment. The removal of the JLA units would have to be completed by the end of 1993. The Slovene national security system would begin to function on 1 January 1992, and we believe that at that time the intelligence officers from the Defense Ministry will open a lot of bottles of champagne with twofold satisfaction.

[Box, p 12]

Trend: Imports of Military Equipment

The national defense part of the national security system is opposed to its own defense industry, while citing the inefficiency, megalomania, and monopolism of the Yugoslav defense industry complex. That attitude and the determination that Slovenia cannot afford exclusive producers of military equipment, mean an indication of bad times ahead for the 76 Slovene enterprises that have so far made products indirectly or directly for the needs of the (Yugoslav) armed forces. In 1989, in fact, those enterprises did 210 million [German] marks in business, but today the defense industry is talking about the need to convert the part of the defense industry that does not have good prospects and that is producing military equipment that is not needed for the new times and new concepts.

[Box, p 13]

Violation of Civil Defense

Fundamental organizational and functional changes are being promised for the civil defense system. Instead of the present system, which is extremely massive and difficult to manage and control, a new system is supposed to emerge, which would be effective, efficient, and capable of responding to all sorts of disasters. Specifically, it is planned that the number of members of civil defense would be reduced from more than 260,000 people to 70,000 to 100,000 people, and 50,000 to 60,000 members would work in the operational staffs of the fire-fighting organizations, which would afterwards handle general rescue tasks. The members of those units would function in all situations, even in wars. The division of authority for handling general rescue tasks is also planned for the mountain and cave rescue services.

Collapse of Yugoslav Military Industry

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in Serbo-Croatian 3 Apr 91 p 7

[Article by Milan Jelovac: "Collapse of Military Industry in Yugoslavia"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] The military-industrial complex, during the past decade the most developed part of the Yugoslav economy, is now in a state of ruin—as many as 35,000 employees are receiving minimum pay, and several thousand workers are waiting for jobs. According to a federal law, these enterprises cannot be declared insolvent without the approval of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense [FSND]....

How to fairly divide the inventory of military armaments and materiel as well as war technology in the event that a confederal model is introduced or individual republics become independent is an important political and strategic question. The Yugoslav military industry must also be examined in this context. Built up and continually modernized over the past 40 years, the domestic military-industrial sector today comprises the Boards for Research, Development, and Production of Armaments and Materiel, and the Federal Directorate for Special-Purpose Trade and Production Reserves. This federal institution within the framework of the FSND has dual status: On the one hand, it is a directorate for the FEC [Federal Executive Council], while on the other hand it is part of the military-economic sector. Its basic activity is the import and export of armaments and materiel. Also directly included in the Yugoslav military-economic sector are three military-technical institutes (for land, air, and naval technology), as well as 36 enterprises that are designated for the production of armaments and materiel based on a decision by the FEC. Aside from these enterprises registered by the FEC, there are other firms involved in producing armaments and materiel which engage in market-oriented, civilian production, as well as military production. The Community

of the Armaments and Materiel Industry of Yugoslavia currently includes 54 enterprises who work together with more than 1,000 subcontractors throughout the country.

The heart of the present-day military industry consists of several prewar military installations producing airplanes, weapons, explosives, and ammunition (the Belgrade and Novi Sad aviation industry, Topolivnica in Kragujevac, and today "Zastava," "Prva Iskra" in Baric, "Vistad" in Valjevo, "Krusik" and "Prvi Partizan" in Titovo Uzice, "Kamnik," etc.). The expert manpower at the Kragujevac plant formed the framework for the formation and development of today's military industry. Rapid development and buildup began after 1948 and the Cominform resolution. The period of buildup of the military-industrial sector lasted exactly from 1948 to 1954, based on the principle of "locations that are as secure as possible," according to the Federal Directorate for Special-Purpose Trade and Production Reserves. Some of the existing plants were moved further into the interior of the country. Military works were developed primarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in this way part of Kragujevac's "Zastava" became "Bratstvo" in Novi Travnik, "Prvi Partizan" became "Igman" in Konjic, and "Vazduhoplovna Industrija Beograd" [Belgrade Aviation Industry] became "Soko" in Mostar. The vast majority of present-day military plants were established during the 1950's.

After the partial relaxation of the political situation, the further construction of military production works was continued according to the principle of covering the entire territory of the SFRY. Based on this principle, four plants were built in Montenegro, two in Macedonia, and one in Kosovo, so that today the military-industrial sector is spread across the area of Yugoslavia.

Seventy Percent of Plants in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Having come into being amidst these circumstances, the military industry in time became overcapacitated, and full employment was achieved only in the first phase of its existence. Because of this, the military-industrial sector underwent a transformation, and moved into civilian production. The 1970's saw the greatest investment in the military industry, and a significant leap forward was made in modernizing and equipping the production capacities. New technologies were applied, and in addition to classical armaments and materiel, the production of more complex systems was begun, especially tanks, airplanes, missile systems, and fire control systems. More complex types of armaments were exported, primarily to Third World countries, resulting in a significant influx of foreign exchange.

Approximately 70 percent of the production capacities for armaments and materiel are located in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reason for the great concentration of military works in these two republics, according to people in the Federal Directorate, is geostrategic considerations. Macedonia and Montenegro account for

2 percent of capacities, while 15 percent of all military plants are located in Croatia. Slovenia, we are told, accounts for 10 percent of the total potential. "The domestic military industry consists of unitary plants, because there is no plant where the entire production cycle can be performed for any type of armaments, aside from gun ammunition," says the Federal Directorate. "Nor does any republic have a complete range of production of top-priority military systems, and in the event of some other organization of Yugoslavia or of the formation of sovereign states, no one would have a well-rounded, special-purpose production capacity," the Federal Directorate notes. In terms of mutual dependency, Yugoslavia has not one single product that could be built in one republic without depending on the others. "During the buildup, development, and performance of new production, during the selection of subcontractors and the designation of the parties responsible for development and production, the consideration was that problems should be tackled by those who are the most capable, regardless of where they come from," says Marijan Dzepina, president of the Executive Committee of the Community of the Armaments and Materiel Industry of Yugoslavia.

Parceled-Out Production

"An illustrative example is the production of the M-84 tank," says Dzepina, who is also director of RIZ in Zagreb. "The finishing plant for this tank is 'Djuro Djakovic' in Slavonski Brod. However, that enterprise is involved in only 20 percent of the overall tank, because more than 1,000 subcontractors from across the country are involved in developing and equipping this combat system." During the 1980's, the military industry was developed in regions where it was largely unrepresented. In Croatia, for example, there were only two enterprises in 1980 that were involved in the production of armaments and materiel. Now, however, there are 12 enterprises with the status of producers of armaments and materiel in the Republic of Croatia, and there is a much larger number of firms working on the production of armaments for the benefit of the finishing plants.

Croatia has almost the entire shipbuilding industry as well as everything associated with the Navy, from maritime vessels, ships, and submarines to equipment and parts for underwater weaponry. There are three Croatian shipyards in the military-industrial sector (Split, Kraljevica, Greben), "Brodoprojekt," a project organization, and the "Maritime Institute" in Zagreb, which is directly linked to the military-industrial complex. In the engineering part of the military-industrial sector, four enterprises are in Croatia: "Djuro Djakovic," which is a finishing plant for tanks, "Dalit," "Marko Oreskovic" in Licki Osik, and "Jugoturbina" in Karlovac. The "Marko Oreskovic" enterprise is the only one in Croatia that produces higher caliber armaments. The Croatian electronics industry is also involved in the military-industrial sector. "RIZ," "Koncar," "Elka," and "Tesla"

are involved in the production of all of the more complex armaments and materiel for use by all three branches of the armed forces.

"Deficit" of \$451 Million

The Yugoslav military industry is now in the most critical position since its establishment, because in terms of its capacities, technologies, and manpower it is at the highest level, but in terms of utilizing its capacities and its opportunities for sales within the country it is at the lowest level possible. What is the reason for this clearly unoptimistic state of our domestic military industry? First of all, the weak and inadequate influx of money into the federal coffers. Because resources for technological modernization of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] are realized primarily in enterprises of the military industry, and the level of these investments has a very direct effect on the current business results and overall development of this industry. The share of total JNA resources devoted to equipping and modernizing the Army was 38.5 percent in 1988, 21.9 percent in 1989, and 19.8 percent last year, while this figure is reduced to only 15.65 percent for 1991. Considering these indicators, it is obvious that, practically speaking, production cannot be sustained, not even in capacities that have contracts for the export trade.

The catastrophic state of the military industry was the subject of discussions between representatives of ZINVOJ [Special-Interest Community of Yugoslav Armament and Military Equipment Manufacturers] and the head and vice presidents of the federal government, which were held two weeks ago at the FEC. Military economists from the FEC are calling for the resolution of three key questions. First, the question of employment of capacities of the military industry, which should commit 30 percent of its capacities to the needs of the SFRY armed forces, 30 percent to exports, 10 percent to mutual cooperation, and 30 percent to market-oriented, civilian programs. The FEC is also demanding that the question of collecting payments for exports be resolved, because at present \$451 million is outstanding, primarily from Iraq, Libya, and other Third World countries. "Repayment would give the military industry a starting foundation, because even the commitment to the needs of the SFRY armed forces has been left without permanent working capital," says the Federal Directorate, adding that "simply maintaining the same pace means that imports are projected for 30 percent of capacities, because already at the beginning of 1991 there are agreements for around \$700 million."

No Sign of Money

The current critical situation in the military industry was a subject of discussion with all the republic governments who were asked to allow the FEC and FSND 30 percent employment for the armed forces and to help in the restructuring and financial restoration of part of the military economy. The FEC has called for the establishment of a federal agency for restructuring, while the

republican governments have asked that the military industry and enterprises that are operating at a loss be specially monitored within the framework of existing agencies for restructuring.

Of the 12 enterprises in Croatia, one has gone bankrupt—"Etas-Koncar-Split"—two are suffering major losses—"Dalit-Daruvar" and "Marko Oreskovic-Licki Osik"—and all the others are on the verge of going under. "In Croatia, there have been talks with the new government on the situation in the military industry, but every time the Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Croatia has sent different people to the talks. These frequent changes impede cooperation, but an appropriate solution will have to be found," says the Federal Directorate for Special-Purpose Trade and Production Reserves. The restructuring that is expected by the military-industrial sector will not happen without difficulties, Belgrade contends, because "additional money is needed, but it is not to be found anywhere, neither in the federal nor in the republican budget, nor in business banks. I have spoken with Croatian Minister of Finance Marijan Hanzekovic, who said that the government will secure money for business banks. When I asked him under what conditions they will grant credit, and thus at what interest rates, he said that that was up to the banks. Paying 60 to 90 percent interest to the bank simply

means that not a single enterprise will have a chance, because there is no program that can realize that kind of profit and that kind of return," says Marijan Dzepina. "Especially not under the conditions of military production for this country's armed forces, where the system for establishing prices is based on expenditures, and thus on the level of outlay plus hourly wages for workers."

The Federal Directorate for Special-Purpose Trade and Production Reserves, which is concerned with armaments and war technology and materiel, says that there is a solution to the crisis. They say that they expect a great deal from the transformation of ownership. Because with state participation, it is possible to create joint-stock companies, mixed enterprises, holding companies... "In the name of the state, the FSND can no longer be the owner," say the uniformed, but nonetheless amiable economists from the Federal Directorate. As soon as the current situation is resolved, the 35,000 workers receiving minimum pay and the several thousand workers waiting for jobs will breathe easier. "Because everyone in this country is connected, so that the minute you disrupt one link, the whole system breaks apart," say Col. Mihajlo Zivanovic and Col. Dusan Buncic of the Federal Directorate for Special-Purpose Trade and Production Reserves.

BULGARIA

Government Commission Discusses Energy Supplies

AU0805202491 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1630 GMT 8 May 91

[Text] At the Council of Ministers today, the members of the Commission for Day-to-Day Coordination and Control of National Raw Material and Energy Supplies met in session. The main topics discussed at the meeting were the state of deliveries and production of energy resources, the distribution of liquid and solid fuels throughout the country, and the satisfaction of fuel requirements. Here is a report from our correspondent Bilyana Mikhaylova.

[Begin Mikhaylova recording] The maximum quantity of gasoline that we can expect to receive in May is 35,000 tonnes. By comparison, 58,000 tonnes were consumed by road vehicles during April. At the moment, the petroleum deliveries from the Soviet Union are running according to schedule, but the Neftokhim Refinery in Burgas is operating at reduced capacity because the refining installations are being overhauled. The balance of supplies to gasoline stations at the moment is considered to be extremely shaky. All forecasts show that, in the near future, vehicle owners will have to dig deeper into their pockets. But the main problem is where the state enterprises will get their funds from; at the moment, they are still receiving money from the budget, but this will not continue for long.

Aleksandur Tomov, chairman of the commission, decreed that it was essential to ensure the supply of the 40,000 tonnes of diesel fuel required by agriculture during May, but this will probably be one of the last gestures made by the government. The intention is to change over the entire national energy system to operate on market principles. The reorganization is under way on the basis of projects worked out by World Bank specialists. It is expected that the centralized distribution of fuels will be ended as of 1 June. The budget is no longer in a position to cover the difference between the fixed and the market prices. The market principle is already well known, and Mr. Tomov drew a comparison between the fuel problem and the recent problem with newsprint, where things settled down after the initial shock. Continuing the comparison, he said that just as we are able to buy newspapers costing two leva, we will be able to buy coal costing 1,000 leva per tonne.

The Council of Ministers is expected to issue a decree that will define the future policy relating to the consumption of energy resources, and the commission will be turned into an organ for restructuring the energy system on a market basis.

Another piece of news from today's meeting concerns a briefing about the actions undertaken in connection with the need of implementing measures against the introduction of special operating conditions for the Nos. 1 to 4

Generating Units at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. The briefing was provided by Prof. Lyudmil Genov, chairman of the Committee for Power Supply. We have received offers of aid, in principle, from the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] Program, the European Investment Bank, and the World Bank, but [passage indistinct].

In essence, even if we receive money from abroad, we will be able to make use of this money only at the end of next year, so that once again people are looking for the budget to provide funds. At the very least, the preparation and maintenance of a register of radioactive waste cannot be further delayed. [end recording]

Pushkarov on Lukanov Performance, Privatization

AU0805112791 Sofia BTA in English 1000 GMT
8 May 91

[Text] Plovdiv, May 8 (BTA)—Mr. Ivan Pushkarov, minister of industry, trade and services, has announced that a mechanism is being prepared to "converse" the companies' debts, shifting some of the burden to the state and the banks. It became clear he had in mind an amount of about 40 billion leva at previous prices which could not be "transferred to the state" as the commercial banks would go bankrupt and the financial system would be ruined. The redistribution of burdens, coordinated with the IMF, will start in the next 15 or 20 days. More than 60 percent of the state companies, however, are in position to pay the interest on their credits if granted a certain "gratis period."

At the meeting he had with managers of Bulgarian companies at the Plovdiv Fair yesterday, Mr. Pushkarov said that in the last 20 days Bulgaria's foreign trade relations have been revived, her relations with the Soviet Union included.

Mr. Pushkarov criticized ex-Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov for his attempts to press on the business executives his own view as to the solution of these problems. He pointed out that now the Soviet market accounts for only 20 or 25 percent of the Bulgarian companies' contracts, the reason for which are not only the objective difficulties the Soviet economy faces, but also "Gorbachev's emotional reaction" to the anti-Soviet political drives in this country which Mr. Pushkarov called "preposterous."

Mr. Pushkarov believes that the privatization of the so-called "first-echelon branches" will be the major problem of the second phase of the reform.

He said that the auctioning of the first filling stations will start in ten days. He defined the privatization rather as a political process but stressed that the reform can be successful only if privatization is carried out at lightning speed, within a couple of years. He sees the beginning of

this process in spontaneous demonopolization, especially of companies in horizontal integration. Mr. Pushkarov considers the breaking up of the monopoly (without harming trade marks) to be the first step towards overcoming the workers' psychological barrier and their fears that there would be manipulations "at high managerial levels." He also promised concessions for small-scale private business through starting a tax concession fund which, however, will help along manufacturers only and not profiteers.

Future of Belene Nuclear Power Plant

Introduction

91BA0449A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
25 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Mara Atanasova: "What Is Happening With the Belene Nuclear Power Plant?"]

[Text] Many arguments "for" and "against" the construction of the Belene nuclear power plant (NPP) have already been voiced and written. The question as to the fate of the plant, however, has still not received a definite answer. Does the Belene NPP have a future? This problem was again placed on the agenda of the Grand National Assembly's Commission on Power Engineering.

We offer you two viewpoints, presented especially to DELOVI SVYAT. The editors are prepared to publish other opinions, as well.

Cancel or Modify

91BA0449B Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
25 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Elenko Bozhkov, national representative for the Union of Democratic Forces and deputy chairman of the Grand National Assembly's Commission on Power Engineering: "We Do Not Need This Atomic Reactor"]

[Text] Among some power engineers, there exists a desire that is difficult to overcome to continue the construction of the Belene NPP [nuclear power plant]. What are their motives? In the near future, they say, Bulgaria will need another 1,000 megawatts of installed capacity. Besides that, so far more than sufficient funds have been invested in the Belene NPP. Unfortunately, however, no one can understand exactly how much is invested. And how much more needs to be invested for the Belene NPP to function completely is a question that is also unclear.

The reactor at Belene is type VVER-1000 [water-water nuclear reactor]. However, it also requires the construction of a pumped-storage hydroelectric plant that is able to work during the nightly minimum hours and to compensate the reactor's influence. The reason is that the VVER-1000 type reactor cannot be regulated. That means that one also has to add investments for a

pumped-storage hydroelectric plant to the investments for the nuclear power plant. One also has to add the question of investments for preserving manufactured fuel and waste, as well as the liquidation of the plant. According to final figures, the funds for this are as much as for a 1,000-megawatt energy block.

It is known that a dynamic restructuring of our economy lies ahead because of the transition to a market economy. Consequently, energy consumption will have to decrease drastically. As a result, the energy mastodons in industry of the Chervena Mogila and Kremikovtsi type will prove to be unnecessary, if everything goes as it should. In other words, the rate of increase in energy consumption will be reduced.

Besides that, a 1,000-megawatt block is approximately one-sixth of the functioning capacity in the energy system. Thus, the decline of one such block automatically leads to a breakdown of the system. For an energy system to function normally, the greatest single capacity has to be approximately equal to one-twentieth of the installation capacity.

The type of steam generators that are supplied and installed at the Belene NPP have an exceptionally large defect. They have a resource life of two to three years, and that makes the reactor senseless, in practice.

Without broaching either the problems of radiation safety or the ecological aspects of the construction of the Belene NPP, from a purely economically pragmatic aspect, I feel that we do not need this reactor.

What are the other alternatives for producing electric power in Bulgaria? Small mobile gas turbine plants could be used. Here we have very large reserves because the gas main from the USSR to Turkey and Greece runs through Bulgaria. The Italian gas turbine installations with utilization boilers are well known for having a large coefficient of efficiency. These are mobile plants, which can be used at the peak moments of energy consumption.

Another alternative: At the Belene site, a conventional thermoelectric power plant could be built that would use imported fuel, supplied along the Danube. One can also consider production of electrical power from burning coal in a boiling layer. Finland is a very good example of this.

Need Foreseen

91BA0449C Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
25 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Georgi Nikolov, national representative from the 48th Svishtov voting region (Bulgarian Socialist Party) and secretary of the Economic Policy Commission at the Grand National Assembly: "We Simply Want a Chance for Our Children"]

[Text] The issue of the Belene NPP [nuclear power plant] came to the fore in the Svishtov region at the beginning

of 1990. The then National Assembly elected a commission that was to evaluate whether it was necessary to continue the construction of the atomic plant. To the great disappointment of the inhabitants of our region, this commission did not finish the job. The problem for the Belene NPP became very severe during the elections, when some political forces wanted to derive political dividends from the issue. Happily, the political forces in Svishtov itself were unified during the elections in their stand that the construction of the Belene NPP must finally be stopped.

The population of the Svishtov region continues to worry about the fate of the atomic plant at Belene. I asked Prime Minister Dimitur Popov what the government's stand on this issue was. He answered rather laconically that they are freezing building of the plant, and that, for this year, they do not foresee funds for its construction. This answer does not satisfy me. I would like to be clear as to the position of the government and the Committee on Power Engineering not just for this year. We do not want a second Chernobyl.

I side with colleague Elenko Bozhkov that some power engineers want too much to continue construction of the Belene NPP. It is not a secret that whole families worked at the site, and it is natural for them to be interested in the plant's construction. At a meeting of the Grand National Assembly's Committee on Power Engineering, it was said that power engineering must cease being a "state scholarship student." It must be self-supporting. That is correct in principle. But the question is at what price and with what means will our power engineering be self-supporting. At the committee meeting, it was said that the primary way to do this is to export energy from the Belene NPP.

If the government decides to continue the construction of the plant, that will affect a good many people from north-central Bulgaria. Five cities and 54 villages from north-central Bulgaria fall within the borders of the 30-km sanitary-protective zone at the Belene NPP, and four cities and 30 villages in Romania. The interim executive committee of Svishtov was visited by the administration of the opposite Romanian city. Our neighbors are also alarmed about the possible continuation of the plant's construction. Another thing that disturbs the inhabitants of the Svishtov region is that construction of the plant will jeopardize the livelihood of many people. The only enterprise that produces children's food is located in Svishtov, animals are exported abroad from Svishtov, there is an enterprise from the canning industry here, and the famous Svishtov "Kaberne" is produced here. It will also strike a blow at agriculture because 2 million decares of cultivatable land fall within the sanitary-protective zone.

Five independent expert reports by scientists from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences are available, which are categorically against construction of the Belene NPP. There is information that, in the construction so far, materials were added without a certificate and that poor-quality building operations were carried out. When the decision regarding construction was made, no ecological investigation was done. It is necessary to conduct a full analysis of what has been completed so far, to calculate the investments, and to assess the quality of work and available resources. A decision has to be made not only from the standpoint of today, but also of the future. We do not want the Belene NPP to become "an apple of discord." We simply want a chance for our children.

BULGARIA

Earthquake Recovery Fund Missing

91BA0442A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 11 Mar 91

[Article in three installments by Veliana Khristova: "Strazhitsa: Where Are the Millions?"]

[11 Mar p 4]

[Text] New blocks and beautiful, solidly built houses, two or three stories high, with wood and forged-iron decorations, ordinarily seen only on picture cards, are lined up on either side of a number of streets. Elsewhere, we see huts and trailers glued to each other, protected from wind and cold with whatever materials were handy.

After the nationwide feeling of compassion and the numerous contributions and the national free work day to help Strazhitsa, which was held on Saturday, 24 January 1987, and after benefit concerts and sports meets to benefit the suffering areas, a total of some 72 million leva was raised. That was the crutch on which the municipality leaned during the first year following the earthquake. Eleven months later, however, only 106 houses were under construction, and only one was completed instead of the planned 437.

Huge amounts of construction facilities and materials began to accumulate in Strazhitsa in 1987. As was proper, Todor Zhivkov, as well, visited the municipality. Hearing complaints about the scarcity of cadres, he peremptorily banged his fist on the table: "Those who refuse to come to Strazhitsa, as assigned, will lose their diplomas and be sent to work. We shall not play any games here. And that is all! The only laws that are valid here are those of the revolution. No other laws prevail."

After accepting "human and communist gratitude" for his visit, he departed and, by the strength of the "revolutionary" laws, 116 construction firms from throughout the country passed through Strazhitsa (only 12 remain now), having profited from all the advantages provided in the regulations.

To understand what is taking place in Strazhitsa now, one should become suitably familiar with the maximal facilities given for the construction. The state anticipated all needs:

For the owners: A 20-year interest-free loan from the BSK [State Savings Bank]; up to 2,000 leva in aid to young families and the socially underprivileged. For construction work by the owners themselves, the materials could be purchased by the citizens at wholesale prices f.o.b. [free on board] (the differential was paid out of the budget). For the socially deprived, the construction was to be done by the state and assigned to construction firms. The plans for the new houses were free of charge. The owner received the appraised value of the destroyed property and 30 percent of the cost of the new construction. The residents of other settlements were given the

right to all facilities and a free lot on which to build. Electricity and other payments for the trailers and the huts were paid out of the "earthquake" fund.

To those directly participating in the restoration work: Mechanization and transportation facilities were provided for their specific purposes. An additional wage coefficient and additional bonuses for work under more difficult living conditions were introduced. Construction workers living elsewhere were paid per diem allocations.

It may seem stupid but, in practice, all the difficulties to be discussed below were simply the result of the notorious Ruling No. 44 of the Council of Ministers Bureau, and the Second and 29th Council of Ministers letters.

Generally speaking, the difficulties of the people of Strazhitsa could be described as "walking on money but remaining poor."

No one kept track of the results of the presence of many construction workers. Here is a single fact: Two specialists assigned from Lovech cost the municipality 669.20 leva for one month's stay. Privately operating scoundrels appeared, and brigades came and went, simply wasting funds. It is known, for example, that the brigade headed by Mincho Grozdanov did work worth less than 1 million but wasted 2.1 million leva.

As the people of Strazhitsa joked, this big village became a huge construction site. An incalculable amount of equipment was piled up, and hangars were built as though the project of the century was under construction. The production base of the newly created ISP, which stands for investment-construction enterprise (investor and builder under the same roof!), absorbed millions.

Materials for Strazhitsa were always procured on a priority basis, regardless of scarcity. Yet, what was left from the collapsed houses remained virtually unused.... The houses were wrecked by the state with the help of the construction organizations, instead of ordering the people themselves to raze them in order to salvage materials and reuse them, said Trifon Trifonov, chairman of the temporary municipal management. "Many areas were wrecked and construction workers were paid for the work, but it was not demanded that they build on the same site. As a result, to this day, one-half of new housing remains unfinished."

Although the problem was how to get the people out of the trailers as quickly as possible, the BKS company, for example, began to build...a dam with a nursery and recreation cottages around it. According to Stefan Staykov, the firm's general director, the 120,000 cubic meters of water in the reservoir will become very necessary in a couple of years, and the nursery that was built to landscape the city will be worth about 1 million leva. Such is indeed probably the case, but this hardly warms the more than 200 families that, for the fifth consecutive winter, are huddling in the trailers.

[12 Mar p 4]

[Text] As the saying goes, "everybody and his brother" passed through Strazhitsa. Some construction workers, to this day, neglect the construction projects while working on some private construction deal. In general, it is impossible to determine how much equipment, imported and expensive, was wrecked because of carelessness and poor management, or how much materials taken away from other projects for the sake of Strazhitsa were pilfered or used in various cottages or else sold inside Bulgaria and even abroad.

The firms are falling behind their plan and are not settling their accounts with the municipality. Construction materials have now become scarce, something that is postponing construction deadlines. According to engineer Dimitur Kolev, deputy director of the Tasladzha investment firm, "Prices are climbing murderously. There is a scarcity of materials, and now, considering the prices, when a single house will cost 100,000 leva, how many houses shall we be able to build this year?"

The rumor making the rounds is that the firms are building projects for "big wheels" and for their own people, along the sea, in Arbanasi, and elsewhere. Although the firm managements categorically claim that they are not depriving Strazhitsa or using its money and materials, even Ivan Peykov, the bank director, is unable to keep track of their accounts and believes that this requires a serious and full audit of their activities. The opportunity provided to start building by assigning it without cost estimates meant, in practice, that, subsequently, one could inflate expenditures as much as one felt.

One thing, however, is clear: Both the materials and the equipment so far shipped to the area would have sufficed to build not one but two settlements like Strazhitsa. According to the Sroykomplekt Economic Trust, which is a basic supplier of materials, on the basis of the outlay rates per housing in an earthquake-prone area, Strazhitsa has already received cement for 4,152 houses, bricks for 2,354, lumber for 3,215, metal for 2,557, pane glass for 2,460, and sanitation faience for 3,389.

According to Trifon Trifonov, chairman of the temporary municipal management, at the present time, 1,652 of the 3,701 houses to be built anew have been completed, 889 are under construction, and 1,160 are waiting their turn to be rebuilt. About 200 houses have not been started. What this means to the owners, considering the lack of materials and the new prices, is more than clear.

Boyanka Kirilova, who represents the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] in the temporary municipal management, is worried that the situation will become even more difficult because the enterprises are now beginning to lay off people, and unemployment has appeared, which will make life even harder. "All that Strazhitsa has is mud, dust, and discontent," she believes. "There was unfairness from the very start. Resolution No. 2 is

totalitarian because, to prevent depopulation of the area, people from other places were given the right to build here. Meanwhile, building lots belonging to Strazhitsa people were confiscated, and the people are displeased."

Last year, the local investment-construction enterprise (ISP) was split into four separate firms, with four separate administrations. SIMA, one of them, was paid bonuses for 1990, which left a bitter taste in the mouths of the people of Strazhitsa. Not that they were illegal. They were the result of the skillful manipulation of economic indicators that were considered overfulfilled. For example, some of the wage fund was saved. With a planned loss of 1,210,000 leva, the firm lost 1,209,000 leva—that is, it saved 1,000 leva from the planned losses. This increased the profit margin.

It is true that, with the current lack of materials and forced idling, there is the danger that the construction workers will disperse. It is true that they must be given a bonus, based on the work they have done. It is also true, but hardly moral, to work on the basis of a planned loss equaling in cost that of more than 40 houses in Strazhitsa. The finished construction lags catastrophically behind in terms of schedules, particularly for 1990 (the fulfillment of the plan for the municipality is 14.7 percent). A letter issued by the Metalsnab PSP [Marketing Economic Enterprise] in Gorna Oryakhovitsa warns that the maximal amounts set for metal and metal goods for 1991 are small. Meanwhile, the SIP is giving part of its supplies to the Viktoriya firm (in Kesarevo), which is not allowed to use materials destined for Strazhitsa.

The waste can be seen with the naked eye, even covered as it is by the thick layer of mud. Everywhere one can see discarded lumber, iron, and tin sheets. It is impossible to say how many of the thousands of trailers that were procured (each costing 4,000-8,000 leva) and the 700 huts will be reusable after their present occupants have left. In some of them, only the iron structures remain, while the lumber may be seen as having been used in cattle fencing. Hogs are being raised in the old trailers along with plants because the electricity for them so far was paid by the municipality and will be paid by the tenants only as of this January.

According to Tsanka Koleva, secretary of the municipal council of the Fatherland Union, no one knows what the fate of the trailers has been. Do 1,000 trailers remain? They are bound to be needed somewhere else, and they should have gone there instead of being dragged to various cottages and vineyards. All of this worsens the budget at the expense of our common pocketbook. The people are irritated by the fact that a great deal was procured but only a few people benefited, said she.

It would be interesting to estimate what it would cost if, after repairing them, these trailers were to be auctioned off, let us say. (Their current price is now 20,000-22,000 leva per trailer.)

In one end of Strazhitsa, one can see 10 identical new houses (costing some 47,000 leva each). Two of them are inhabited and the others remain empty. However, the path in the snow leading to them has been well trodden. What is moving along this path becomes clear when we see that all 11 doors and window sills of those houses have been removed. By spring, the roof tiles and the timber structures will probably disappear, as well.

[13 Mar p 6]

[Text] The people of Strazhitsa should not be blamed for demanding that their city become more beautiful and for the fact that everyone would like to build a big house for himself. It would be improper to blame them because of the horror they lived through as they looked at their gutted walls and little crumbling houses bending like centenarian grandmothers. It would be equally wrong because of the difficult winters since that time. However, if one were to ask where the millions have gone, one should also mention certain other equally painful truths.

The biggest problems are created by the lack of any order in house building and allocating. The differences begin in the appraisal of crumbled houses: For some buildings, owners have received, let us say, 5,000 leva; others, after a second expert assessment, have been able to get twice that amount.

The least difficulty is that, instead of making use essentially of construction by individuals, as the law requires, most houses are being built on the basis of state assignments. Fifteen hundred of the 3,701 houses to be rebuilt will be built by the owners themselves. The worst part is that nowhere do the resolutions stipulate that it is a question of rebuilding; there are only general references to building in the area.

On the basis of the principle "if you are given something, take it," many families managed, after the earthquake, through transfers of ownership or by other means, to have two or three new owners, who were also granted the right to build.

It is unlikely that anyone would be able to estimate how many people acquired property after 1986.

The result is that now the grandmother, let us say, lives alone in a two-story house with a garage; her family lives in an apartment; her son or her son-in-law is building his own house; and the grandchildren have been settled, as well, although some of them may be residents of Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Turnovo, or Sofia.

All this is being done with government money.

It would have been absolutely proper for budget funds to be provided only to restore the damaged property, while, on a broader scale, more owners build their own houses using their own money, as millions of Bulgarians are doing in other cities, having waited some 20 years for a one-bedroom apartment. Here are a few among numerous examples:

—*Ivan Peykov, bank director.* He lives with his wife in an apartment. His mother has a new house. He is building a third house in his wife's parents name, although they live in a village.

—*Ivan Tsvyatkov, postmaster.* The little crumbling house of the past has been replaced by a two-story house with two garages (an area of about 318 square meters, costing about 111,000 leva, 57,000 of which was provided by the state and 54,000 by an interest-free loan). He had to wait for his son to turn 18 so that, according to the present law, he could acquire the right to ownership.

Fifteen percent of the housing built by the Nikola Parapunov firm was for people who previously had no property; 8 percent of the houses were built for single individuals.

Only a commission of specialists could determine the size of the built-up area in Strazhitsa today, as compared to the built-up area prior to the earthquake. It may turn out that Strazhitsa was rebuilt twice.

Meanwhile, the workers are complaining unanimously. Some owners seem to be waiting for their new house to be cleaned up before they put on their slippers and go inside (as is done in the West); others have refused to supply water from their yard to their neighbors; others again have refused to accept the house because of a missing doorknob. The people mention the neighboring village of Popovo, where houses are built exclusively by their owners, and, as has always been the case in Bulgarian lands, where everyone mixes the concrete, from the child to the grandfather. It is also being said, however, that Popovo had no friend in high places, one like Dimitur Stoyanov for Strazhitsa, and that clearly the money in Popovo was not allocated so indiscriminately.

The people of Strazhitsa have reason to be indignant. Many people in other settlements, who had the right to build on lots granted free of charge, have already built their houses and have even asked the council to build housing for them. Some of them live elsewhere but keep a house in Strazhitsa. This is confirmed by an ad in USTREM, the municipal newspaper in Gorna Oryakhovitsa, placed by Ivo Stomov: "New house for sale in Strazhitsa. Call 4-67-92." The owner will collect the money, forgetting that he owes the municipality for a free lot and a plan, 2,000 leva of one-time aid, 30 percent of the estimated value, materials bought at wholesale prices, and an interest-free loan. There was also an add in VECHERNI NOVINI to exchange a new house in Strazhitsa for an apartment in Sofia.

Indeed, our state seems to be quite humane in searching throughout the country for an owner who could come and accept an already built house. Meanwhile, the residents of Strazhitsa, whose houses collapsed, have been waiting, for the fifth consecutive winter, living in trailers and huts, probably the only ones with a legitimate right to be given those houses, which were built with state money, and which are not needed by other people.

While some people are exchanging black humor jokes ("It was a good thing we had this earthquake so we could straighten out our situations so cheaply"), others have lost patience, while they live in huts. The most deprived are those whose property was confiscated in accordance with the urban construction plan for a new, modern Strazhitsa. About 200 families are still waiting their turns to be given building lots.

The Khristo Stanev family (with two grown-up children) lives in hut No. 41. The family had a house of 120 square meters and property of about 800 square meters. After the expropriation, it was left with 200 square meters and no likelihood to, let us say, raise a pig. The construction of its house was scheduled to begin in 1990. To this day, however, nothing has been done. "We have become enraged," the wife said. "We have not lost all hope, but look at how many people have come from who-knows-where and already have houses, while we are still waiting."

Twelve members of the Robert Shoshev and Anka Atanasova family live in trailer No. 781. The children have to walk over each other, the adults write with their books on their knees, sitting on the beds near the coal bucket. The mother is suffering from bone tuberculosis, and the father earns a net wage of 403 leva monthly. Nothing is known about their future house, which should be located on a lot across from the trailer. "I did something stupid," said Shoshev. "I ran around, I found planks, and I put a fence around the trailer to keep it private. I was caught, however, and I was forced to pay the fines. What am I to do? No one is paying attention to me."

A person's mouth is not a tap to be turned off. The people are talking and getting angry about the fact that, while other people have been stealing from the budget, they have been left behind and now there is no money, there are no materials, and a square meter of built-up area will be much more expensive than the old 170 leva price. On the anniversary of the earthquake, last December, the people held a meeting to express their concern. Even people with housing spoke out.

Currently, the government and the VNS [Grand National Assembly] are doing whatever they can to help Strazhitsa by extending the facilities granted for construction. However, no one has looked for possibilities with Strazhitsa itself or given thought to correcting the injustices. Knowing how much municipal construction has fallen behind (60 projects have not been started), and even the building of the necessary infrastructure, the approximately 35 million allocated for Strazhitsa this year will look like a drop in the bucket. There are no metal pipes for the water mains. Only 20 percent of them and about 40 percent of the sewer lines have been laid. It is only now that some repairs are being started on the streets (only 4.5 of 95 km have been repaired). The city has only two paved streets. In 1991, the infrastructure alone will require some 20 million leva.

Business circles in Strazhitsa are calling for a comprehensive commission of experts to come to Strazhitsa and investigate the situation thoroughly, to determine the need for basic capital and what must be done to make available reserves public and to set things in order. The errors made in Strazhitsa should be made public in case (God forbid) an earthquake strikes elsewhere.

Having seen and heard all this, a person could leave behind his rubber boots, take the train to Sofia, and forget the millions, the mud, and the pain of the people. How many influential individuals on whom the fate of Strazhitsa depends have acted precisely in this manner?

Educator Proposes Private University

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[Interview with Prof. Bogdan Bogdanov, head of the Classical Studies Department at Sofia University, by Silvia Bogdanova; place and date not given: "Not for the School, but for Life... The First Private University in Bulgaria"—first paragraph is IKONOMIKA introduction]

[Text] The Association for a New Bulgarian University was formed in Sofia, whether by chance or not, on 11 May, the day dedicated to Saints Cyril and Methodius, the Slavic educators. Its fundamental goal is "the establishment of a fund to finance an alternative university that, through its versatile organization, would challenge the inveterate and basically unchangeable structures of higher education in Bulgaria." Will the future private university find its "niche" in Bulgarian higher education? I am asking this question of Professor Bogdan Bogdanov, the chairman of the new association and head of the Classical Studies Department at Sofia University.

[Bogdanova] Professor Bogdanov, recently, along with the economic and political crisis, there is some talk of an "academic" crisis. How do you see the private university's role in solving the problems facing higher education in our country? What kind of statute and structure will it have?

[Bogdanov] The existing higher education system in Bulgaria is related to a strict hierarchical structure in which any lower level unit is completely dependent on a higher one, which, in turn, completely destroys any initiative coming from below. When we speak of a private university, the way ours will be, we understand that, under the prevailing conditions in Bulgaria, this form will have as a goal the protection of higher education from state monopoly, which for now is still very powerful in our country. Once formed, the private university will rely mainly on itself and will depend, above all, on its own initiative. We feel that a flexible structure of the lower units will also be created this way. In this case, even if only symbolically, the concept "private" means independent of the state, which does not actually prevent it from participating with [state] funds. Independence as a principle will be followed even further, within

the university structure itself. A lower structure, such as a department, for example, will not be totally under the rector's office, but, as an independent corporation, to a great extent, it will take care of its own self-sufficiency. We want to create a structure on the federal principle in which individual units will be sufficiently independent of each other both horizontally and vertically.

There are three departments planned so far: economics, the organization of which is in the most advanced stage; law and political science, which will be the second to be formed; and humanities, in which all humanities will be studied. The possibility to freely integrate specialties will be set up within these structures. Theology, art history, and theoretical physics will be taught.

[Bogdanova] I assume that the new structure will be linked to new forms of financing....

[Bogdanov] This will be a university where the units themselves will be responsible for funding as a manifestation of independence. Many of the things in this structure must be new. Most of all, students who pay for this education should not do so out of their own pockets. It is necessary to have institutions and foundations that are interested in young people's educations and in subsidizing them. This subsidizing must have the flexible forms that already exist in the world. If 5,000 leva are needed for a student's education at the moment (3,000 leva for university instruction and 2,000 for room and board), this means that he would have to obtain this money from various institutions by proving to them that he is able to learn. This would make him more active. Knowing that had to return this money, he would behave in a totally different manner from that of students studying at present in our country under the conditions of free education.

[Bogdanova] How can such sponsorship by interested institutions take place during this stage?

[Bogdanov] This is impossible now, and here is the great error committed by Sofia University at this time. According to the Constitution, any Bulgarian citizen has the right to a free education, from which lawyers conclude that, because he has that right, he is not required to get only a free education—that is, he can also pay for one. The question is that these 3,000 leva that students in the law school pay now, for example, are funds that come primarily from their parents rather than from some institutions (even though there are actually some such cases). Besides this, with this money, the student is placed under the same poor study conditions, which must be improved without fail some day in our country. In return for a given payment, we must strive to offer the student beautifully furnished conference rooms, libraries, dormitories, and cafeterias. All this must be done ahead of time. We cannot simply go from free education to one for payment, from state-owned to private, by following the familiar campaign principle.

[Bogdanova] Start-up funds, to at least ensure facilities and equipment, are needed for the new Bulgarian university to start functioning. What are your ideas on this question?

[Bogdanov] Regarding facilities, we hope our government will be understanding and provide us with buildings. We rely on various institutions, Bulgarian and foreign, to sponsor us. We have made the initial contacts. We also expect help from the Open Society foundation, which has its own "New Bulgarian University" program. We do not expect help from only one place. Another probable source of funds are preuniversity language courses, computer science, and other education trends that we plan to organize in the form of a so-called free university. They will not be very expensive, as are many of those now in existence. Through them, we want to create a new form of training on the basis of the free-dialogue principle. So we must have our own initiative in the collection of funds, and, in this respect, we are not afraid. For now, the basic problem is finding buildings, but we will deal with that, too. In any case, we will start to teach when we have modern facilities and not before.

[Bogdanova] Has experience abroad been used in establishing the statute and structure of the future university, and what type of cooperation with institutions from other countries is planned?

[Bogdanov] We are considering, above all, the experience of many foreign universities that do not start training in a specific specialty immediately. Usually, they start with a preparatory level, in which the student simply enters a given department and not until the second year does he determine his specialty. Later, the education process becomes more specialized. According to our plan, after the second year, there will be two specialties, and, after a few more years, there will be one specialty.

What is new and different from our present education system is that training will include graduate and doctoral studies. These are not academic degrees but, rather, levels of education. Graduate studies take nine years, and doctoral studies take 12 years. Few people will have the possibility of extending their educations to such a degree. They will participate in the education process but will be, so to speak, students on a much higher level.

In addition to this, in some departments, we would like to have a large part of the faculty be foreigners who would teach in their respective languages. For example, in the department (or department [in English]) of economics, there will be a part taught only in English. High-level qualifications will be required of our faculty, which will have the opportunity of adding to its knowledge by attending foreign educational institutions. In addition, before we start work, we will have to solve the question of international diploma validation.

[Bogdanova] What will the student admission process be?

[Bogdanov] As I mentioned, we plan to develop preuniversity courses, mainly in languages. They will last two years and will be on a rather high level, so that students entering the university will be trained in part entirely in the foreign language with foreign teachers. Obviously, because of the great interest, we will start with English, but the formation of French and German units is foreseen. This way, those undergoing training will approach the level of Western Europe and the world, and then, later, after completing some part of their educations, they will, without difficulty, continue abroad. This is very important to us because we will be able to keep young people here by providing them with optimum opportunities. Other necessary subjects will be thought in these preuniversity courses of study, which will prepare future students for the high level of the university because the present high school education does not fulfill our requirements. A fee will be charged, but payments will be made according to the candidates' success rate. If the candidates are of value to the university, then there will be forms of tuition exemption. That is, there will be a foundation related to the university that will have funds to give out scholarships and thus help them. Actually, students will not be admitted on the same scale as in the past. Some of the candidates who have qualities and training on the level of the preuniversity courses will be tested, but those tests, I repeat, will not be as numerous as in the past. A large number of the candidates will only have to have a diploma for completed preuniversity courses and pay the appropriate annual tuition. This way, the university will force the present high school education system to change its structure. That is because, even though general culture as provided by our high schools is emphatically on a higher level than, for example, in the American ones, it becomes oddly superfluous with respect to higher education.

As far as study programs, teaching, and testing methods are concerned, they will be specified in the future. Exams will be few in number, but they will be very difficult and will be given in stages in front of large commissions. In no way will we use a system that will quickly finish off a subject, as is done now in our university. Groups will be small, and students will be able to choose from among the lectures of various instructors and put together their own individual programs. Actually, there are experiments with this at Sofia University.


[Bogdanova] Will the future university be competitive with state institutions and other future private competitors? How will you attract Bulgarian students?

[Bogdanov] I have no doubt that the state university must continue to exist, even in its present form, because the state and the private university will create different types of specialists. Also, only after our university is formed will we find out exactly the kind of interrelationships it will have and the kind of influence it will exert on

the state university. In any case, we will always need an institution that will produce officials, in the good sense of the word, trained precisely for civil service. We, however, wish to create specialists who are much more active and much more likely to take risks than those currently trained at Sofia University. There is something else. It is difficult for the average Bulgarian to accept the fact that he can be left without a salary. This scares him. But why? It is obvious that, at this time, there are many people who manage their money outstandingly well, even though they have not been working for a salary for a long time, and then there are those who are not able to do that. We will seek to educate leading and enterprising people. But this is not a deterrent, of course, for the existence of the state university, which would educate competent civil servants, because, one way or another, our country cannot manage without civil servants. As far as future private competitors are concerned, it is not so bad. Other such private institutions should exist so that there is a selection: Some will be eliminated, others will remain, and new flexible forms will be created in a natural way and not by reorganizations "from above." As far as the Bulgarian students are concerned, we will attract them with good facilities, with natural relationships with the university itself, and with the fact that they will have the opportunity to live under normal conditions and to have their social lives at their place of study.

[Bogdanova] How do you see the outlook for the development of private education in Bulgaria and, more specifically, of your university as the ice breaker?

[Bogdanov] It is difficult for me to speak regarding the outlook because we are still at the very beginning, but I do think that private education can play a very important role under our country's conditions. We must keep in mind that, in Germany, for example, the idea of the private university is not at all popular. But the situation there is very different; a flexible state system exists that makes private education almost unnecessary. Things must always be decided specifically. Private education has its place in the United States, for example, because of a number of distinctive features of the United States, as well as its large size. This is also an appropriate version for us. Bulgarians like to see things as their own. The attitude of students and teachers would be different if they could see the university as their own. In this case, I see some relationship with our psychology, and so I feel that what we call private education has a future in our country. Our idea is to educate a new individual, so we have to start at the beginning, outside the framework of the existing educational structures, because I feel that the type that now exists at Sofia University, good or bad, cannot mix with the new type. It is much easier to make something from scratch than it is to incorporate it into such inveterateness, where it would be doomed to total failure from the very beginning.



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